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In this thesis, the social paradigms of inclusion and medicalization are analyzed through 
theoretical research methods. The two paradigms are simultaneously present in our 
modern western countries, guiding our understanding of and reactions to deviance and 
disability. The aim of this study is to examine if these two paradigms are compatible with 
each other, or if they cause contradictions and conflict in the definitions and demarcations 
of normality and deviance.  
 
This is a theoretical study, where the traditional methods of analytical philosophy are 
applied. Most widely used methods in this study are concept analysis and reflective 
equilibrium. Through these methods, the concepts of inclusion and medicalization, as 
well as of normality and deviance, are analyzed, and their similarities and differences are 
evaluated in a holistic manner.  
 
This thesis comes to a conclusion of profound contradictions between the paradigms of 
inclusion and medicalization. Although, there are some similarities between the 
ideologies and the historical package of these paradigms the differences between them 
greater, both in number and severity. Great differences themselves do not necessarily 
mean that the paradigms are incompatible, in this thesis it is argued that the differences 
between inclusion and medicalization are by their nature such that contradictions are 
incompatible. To solve this conflict, firstly, more explicit discussion and clearer 
definitions of the key concepts are needed. This thesis aims to accomplish at least that 
much. Further, also critical analysis and evaluation of the premises and policies of the 
two paradigms is also needed. This thesis also hopes to take a step into that direction.  
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Social sciences and social-political debate is characterized by the changing dominance of 
different paradigms. In the lay-man discussions these paradigms are different frameworks 
and ways of understanding and seeing the world and its phenomena. In the academic 
fields these are the presuppositions and theoretical basis on which the research is 
conducted. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy1 2016; Kuhn 1985) These paradigms 
may change over time and culture, but each predominant paradigm has social power to 
control and regulate the society in which it is currently dominant (see Kuhn 1985). Two 
of the most influential frameworks in the western world at the moment are the paradigms 
of medicalization and inclusion. In this thesis, I will study the connection and 
compatibility of medicalization and inclusion. 
Medicalization (suom. medikalisaatio, lääketieteellistyminen) means, that some 
phenomena and problems of human existence become defined, explained and treated in 
medical terms. Medicalization in itself means “to make medical”, to view the phenomena 
predominantly through the science of medicine, and to include it to be primarily medical 
phenomena. However, in the social debate a negative connotation is often given to 
medicalization, as it is thought to mean exclusively over medicalization or unfounded 
medicalization (suom. ylimedikalisaatio, aiheeton medikalisaatio). (Conrad 1992, 209–
210.) 
Inclusion (suom. inkluusio), for one, means to include, welcome or accept someone or 
something in opposition of segregation and exclusion. (see Biklen 2001; Lipsky & 
Gartner 1999; Saloviita 1999; Turnbull 2016; Väyrynen 2001) The definition of inclusion 
in social settings is quite imprecise and it can be used to mean both a theoretical ideal, a 
																																																						




philosophy of life, or more concrete, practical arrangements and setups – or anything in 
between. In the narrowest sense of the word, it can be understood only as a shared 
physical location. For example, when different people are placed in the same physical 
space, for instance in a classroom. On the other hand, inclusion can be seen as an ethos 
against discrimination, where our differences are taken as a value neutral starting point, 
not only for equality, but also for fair and just treatment, for genuine tolerance and 
participation of everyone. (Biklen 2001, 55–59; Lipsky & Gartner 1996; Lipsky & 
Gartner 1999; Saloviita 1999, 13; Väyrynen 2001, 12–21.) 
The research problems of this thesis are built upon the different ways the concepts of 
normality and deviance are defined in the paradigms of medicalization and inclusion. 
Traditionally, the concepts of sickness and health, and the boundaries between these two, 
have been more central and important for the medical perspective. Nowadays, however, 
as the progress of medicalization is actually the quickest in the field of psychology, the 
concepts of normality and deviance have increased their significance, and even replaced 
the meanings of sickness and health in certain contexts (see Conrad & Schneider 1992, 
Watters 2010, Zola 1972). Inclusion, on the other hand, may be understood as a way to 
relate to deviance and abnormality. Along the lines of the ethos of inclusion, human 
difference and diversity are thought of as a starting point for social life. At the same time, 
however, it is also thought that ultimately people are essentially always more alike than 
different. So, what we all share as humans is way more significant than that which 
separates us. This notion is sometimes called the dilemma of difference. (Lipsky & 
Gartner 1996, 792.) Thus, it is the job of a truly just and fair society to take into account 
these supposed differences in a right way; not overemphasizing them, but constructively 
and committedly supporting individual features and skills in a way, that guarantees the 




Gartner 1996, 763-767.) In contrast to this, medicalization is more of a way to erase 
deviance and abnormality, and bring the deviant people “back to normality” much the 
same way the medical sciences aim to erase or alleviate sickness and make people healthy 
again. This implicitly means, that deviance and certain differences are unwanted and in 
need of changing by intervention, and precisely in a need of medical intervention. 
(Conrad & Schneider 1992, 32.) 
The main research question of this thesis is: In what way and to what extent the basic 
principles of medicalization and inclusion are theoretically compatible? I search the 
answer to this question by first analyzing the ways, that both of these paradigms 
respectively define the characteristics and conditions of the pivotal concepts of normality 
and deviance. From this analysis follows a second question of, how these paradigms relate 
to these concepts. In other words, what theoretical attitudes these paradigms imply to the 
phenomena of deviance and normality? Also, a more applied question follows: What 
practical implications these paradigms have on dealing with normality and deviance in 
the society, and in the school world especially?  
Medicalization and inclusion are largely defined by the conceptions on, and attitudes 
toward normality and deviance. By comparing the domains and definitions of these 
notions, and the logical consequences of the theoretical attitudes these paradigms hold, it 
can be analyzed, to what extend these paradigms share the same values, principles and 
objectives, and how much they differ from each other. In the case of different definitions, 
attitudes and objectives amongst the two paradigms, it is possible to determine, if these 
differences are conceptually contradicting each other, or if it is possible for them to live 
side by side without a logical conflict. In this thesis, I will support the view, that there are 
some fundamentally contradictory differences between inclusion and medicalization, and 




harmoniously together, without either a further division of domains or some supplemental 
conciliatory definitions. However, I will also note, that there are some common factors 
and some mutually supportive notions among these two paradigms, but the similarities 
seem to be more superficial than the differences.  
My hypothesis is, that although both of these paradigms operate largely on the same 
concepts of normality and deviance, the definitions they give to these concepts are 
decisively different. To take things further, the differences in these definitions lead to 
contradictory conclusions, for example, on how to deal with deviance and abnormality, 
and how to manage the problems and challenges they provoke in the society. The 
supposed conclusion is, that although medicalization and inclusion may also support each 
other to some extent, to combine the basic principles of medicalization with the 
philosophy of inclusion will nevertheless be hard at best, and logically contradictory, at 
worst.  
On the other hand, some may speculate, that the process of medicalization has opened the 
door for inclusion, or more precisely – and quite literally – for the deviant people, who 
earlier used to be defined as either sinners or criminals and thus were locked away. These 
definitions did not encourage tolerance or inclusion, and accomplished little more than 
segregation and punishment of already challenged and marginalized people. (Conrad & 
Schneider 1992, 17–57; Vehmas 2005, 53–59.) Compared to these historical perspectives 
on deviance and abnormality, both medicalization and inclusion represent progress 
toward a more merciful attitude. Medical language and intervention, for example, can be 
argued to remove and relieve the stigma of being different and deviant. In doing so, 
medicalization may in fact encourage inclusion and acceptance of widely different 
individuals back into the society. Furthermore, in some cases medical treatment will bring 




course, automatically makes it easier to include these people. (see Turnbull 2016.) 
However, I argue that it is precisely this aim to bring those defined as deviant closer to 
the socially accepted norm, that in fact stands against the most profound philosophical 
ideals of inclusion. 
Along these lines, I assume, that medicalization may be found to go well together or even 
support the physical and spatial inclusion in society and its institutions, like the school 
institution. However, on the other hand, it may be contradictory, as for the most profound 
ideals, and most comprehensive practical implications of inclusion. Also, it has to be 
noted, that medicalization is not necessarily the only, or even the best, way to advance 
and facilitate inclusion. The ways in which medical sciences explain and treat certain 
problems and challenges of human life, may in themselves be harmful or cause negative 
side effects. To overcome the shortcomings and harmful effects of medicalization, the 
theory of social constructionism has been suggested as an alternative framework for 
understanding and reacting to deviance. (see Conrad & Schneider 1992; Vehmas 2005, 
119–124). 
The theme and research questions of my thesis are important and meaningful, because 
our attitudes, prejudices and beliefs guide the way we act around different people, and 
how we face and treat deviant individuals (Cornwall 2012, 135). The research is actual, 
as both paradigms are prominent in the society at the very moment. If they are in 
contradiction with each other, the problems most likely reflect to practice and the real 
word. In this case, the consequences, both for the individual, as for the specific institution 
or the whole society in which these actions are implemented, may be very concrete and 
grave. This study is also actual in the educational discussion specifically, because schools 
are one of the main playgrounds of inclusion at the moment. In the ethos of promoting 




and dispositions, come to the so called “ordinary” or “normal” classes and class rooms 
(see Skrtic 1991; Singer 1988; Kauffman & Hallahan 1993; Mock & Kauffman 2002). 
At least in Finland, the study program of the Department of Teacher Education does not 
yet seem to follow this trend. For example, the special educational teaching and 
experience provided by the studies of the future class teacher are almost nonexistent, 
although these would provide precisely the knowledge and skills now needed to answer 
the modern challenges of any teacher’s working life. (Pinola 2008, 40–43; Tutkinto-
ohjelma 2018–2020.) Especially, when actual teaching and direct experiences are lacking, 
the prejudices and personal opinions of these to-be teachers will significantly influence 
their actions and attitude towards the different learners in their classroom. (Pinola 2008).  
Also, medicalization is an actual research topic in the context of education, because one 
of the most rapidly medicalizing fields is the field of psychology and psychiatry (Watters 
2010, 3–5) which come close to educational sciences, and many forms of very mundane 
and typical deviances that teachers encounter in their work every day. 
 
2. RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODS 
This study is conducted by theoretical research approach. Answers to the research 
questions are searched on an analytical and conceptual level by non-empirical research 
methods. In a theoretical study, like this one, the methods of the analysis and the analysis 
itself are often so closely intertwined, that it is really hard, if not impossible, to make the 
difference between the two, or at least the difference will be rather artificial. In this thesis, 
the research material consists entirely of literary sources in the fields of philosophy, 
sociology and education. Most important and relevant pieces to this study on 
medicalization are the writings of Peter Conrad and Joseph W. Schneider, Irving Kenneth 




most widely used pieces in this thesis are those of  Helen Turnbull, Dorothy Lipsky and 
Alan Gardner. Especially on inclusion, also many Finnish sources are used in this study, 
although the thesis is not confined to the Finnish society or educational system, nor any 
other, as the research takes a more theoretical stance.  
The most central methods of analysis in this study are concept analysis, reflective 
equilibrium and thought experiments as well as logical arguments in an informal form. 
Concept analysis (suom. käsiteanalyysi) means the definition of concepts, and the 
evaluation of these definitions, on the basis of how logically coherent they are, and how 
precisely they denote the wanted meaning of a given concept. The aim of concept analysis 
is to find and define the necessary and sufficient conditions, where the definition applies. 
(see Jackson 1998.)  By concept analysis it is possible to specify the definition of the 
concepts, deepen their meanings, and on one hand, compare different concepts with each 
other, while also, on the other hand, comparing the superiority of different definitions of 
the same denoted concept. Concept analysis can be seen to consist of different phases or 
parts, although these are not in any specific order, or may not even be distinguishable 
from each other. A few of these phases, that can be noticed later on in this study are the 
designation of the critical features, the demonstration of different interpretations, the 
examination of proximate concepts and the forming of different examples on where, and 
how the concept and/or the definition can be used. (Puusa 2008, 36–41.) 
Without going any further in to the epistemology, concepts can be understood as the tools 
of thought or mental representations. The latter is to say that they convey a meaning or 
carry a mental content. Therefore, concepts are psychological entities, which enable our 
cognitive functions, such as classifying, remembering and making inferences. Concepts 
can also be seen as a bridge between the mind and the factual world or between language 




fregean sense, on the other hand, concepts do not necessarily pick up real targets or events 
in the world. That is to say, they do not need to refer to any actual things or concrete 
events in the world. Instead, it suffices if they have a sense. This means, that by concepts 
we can also refer to things that are abstract, supernatural, contra factual or nonexistent, 
much like mythical creatures, for example. (SEP 2011.) 
Our linguistic communication is based on concepts. Language in itself, describes and 
mirrors the reality but also modifies and reconstructs it. If we either talk of the same thing 
by different concepts, or use same concepts to describe different things, the possibility of 
misconception and misunderstanding is evident. Our layman terms and ordinary language 
greatly differs from academic and scientific language and terms, not to mention formal 
logical language. All the research is based on concepts, and the better a researcher can 
define her concepts, the more precise and well based her choices and conclusions will be. 
(Puusa 2008, 37-38.) So, to clarify and analyze the concepts of any research is important 
in itself, but at the same time, concept analysis also gives a justification for the a priori 
nature2 of theoretical research. In analytical theoretical philosophy, there is an 
assumption, that the concept analysis will reveal the meaning of the concept by 
identifying its necessary and sufficient conditions3 and by making the distinction between 
																																																						
2	
A priori means non-empirical or pre-observational. This means that in a priori 
reasoning conclusions can be made via deduction and theoretical logical reasoning only. 
(Aspenson 1998, 34.) 
 
3	
Necessary condition is a condition that has to be fulfilled for the definition or 
argument to be valid. However, the necessary condition alone may not be enough for 
the definition or argument to be comprehensive. Sufficient condition is a condition that 
even alone can fulfill the definition or argument. The condition can be both necessary 





these two. Actually, this is possible only a priori, that is to say, only by non-empirical 
means. (SEP 2011.)  
Reflective equilibrium (suom. harkitun tasapainon menetelmä) is a method of 
philosophical analysis in which separate assumptions, definitions and principles are 
evaluated and compared with each other in a process-like manner, to form a coherent set 
of beliefs, or a logically valid argument. (SEP 2016; Rawls 1971, 19–21, 48–51). The 
aim of this method is the highest possible level of coherence between the lower level 
judgements, intermediate level principles and the highest theories. (Arras 2009; Daniels 
1996.)  In this thesis, I use a method of wide reflective equilibrium. With this method, it 
is also possible to take into account the background theory. In this study, the background 
theory is sociological and has to do with the historical frameworks of deviance and 
normality. Assumptions that rise from this background to the research at hand, are the 
existence and nature of different frameworks in our society and the social power, 
authority and control they have over the members of the said society, or over the common 
atmosphere in that society. The sociological background theory can also take into account 
the change between different social paradigms and the evolution of social opinions over 
time. This theoretic-historical framework is further examined in chapter 5. 
With the method of reflective equilibrium, it is possible to weigh the costs of different 
assumptions, so to say. In doing so, it is then possible to evaluate which assumptions or 
principles must be renounced in order to maintain the harmony between the basic 
principles and assumptions. These basic assumptions often rise from the background 
theory, and therefore, I find it more justifiable to use the wide reflective equilibrium, to 
explicitly take the background assumptions into account. Moreover, it is also possible to 
include empirical propositions and results into the process of reflective equilibrium. In 




application of inclusion in practice, experiences over medical interventions, the contents 
of the doctor’s oath (suom. lääkärinvala) and other concrete documents and treaties on 
inclusion and medicalization.  
Considering that the aim of this thesis is to clarify the definitions of medicalization and 
inclusion, and to formulate a coherent analysis on how well (or how badly) they fit 
together on a theoretical level, the method of reflective equilibrium is well suited for my 
research agendas. The aim is not to come to any definitive solution or to find “the right 
answer”, as this is rarely even possible in theoretical research context. Instead, it is 
enough to demonstrate, that the basic principles of medicalization and inclusion are in a 
fundamental contradiction with each other. The primary aim of this thesis is not to 
examine or analyze the documents, treaties or laws around these two social frameworks.  
Firstly, when applying the method of reflective equilibrium, it is important to identify the 
so called reflected judgements (suom. harkittu arvostelma), ergo the basic assumptions 
or preconceptions where the analysis starts. The reflected judgements of this thesis are 
the descriptions and definitions of medicalization and inclusion, the different ways of 
defining normality and deviance, and the ways both medicalization and inclusion relate 
to these fore mentioned concepts. These reflected judgements are analyzed in the 
subsequent chapters in the abovementioned order. The main hypothesis is, that although 
both the paradigms of medicalization and inclusion operate largely on the concepts of 
normality and deviance, their respective definitions of these concepts are remarkably 
different, maybe even contradictory. These assumed, profound differences may, in turn, 
lead into contradictory conclusion on how best to relate to, and deal with, normality and 
deviance, and how to solve the challenges these phenomena – deviance in particular – 
may cause in the personal life of individuals or in the society in general. These 




In conclusion, it can be said, that the wider framework of this thesis is sociological, while 
the applied methods are mostly familiar from the analytical philosophical research. This 
thesis proceeds from the concept analysis of certain key concepts into the process of 
reflective equilibrium. The conclusion of the reflective method is presented and evaluated 
in chapter 9 of this thesis. The process is started in chapter 4 by analyzing the first 
reflected judgements of normality and deviance. 
 
3. RESEARCH ETHICS 
As this study is theoretical, some of the so called “microethical” (see Hallett & Hallett 
2012) questions of research ethics are redundant in this case, like for example, the 
questions about anonymity and consent. However, other, maybe even more profound 
ethical questions arise concerning the theoretical study on normality and deviance as well 
as inclusion and medicalization. First of all, I want to explicitly state, that my aim is not 
to promote or support one paradigm over the other, let alone to refute or debunk either of 
the two frameworks. Rather, my primary aim is to analyze the logical compatibility of 
the two paradigms with each other, and secondarily to propose some modifications or 
additions to the notion of these paradigms to solve the possible contradictions. These aims 
are pursued by analyzing the concepts of normality and deviance. These concepts, 
however, can be remarkably normative and full of hidden different meanings to different 
people and groups of people. In my analysis, I try to be sensitive and explicit of these 
different connotations and the meanings these connotations may have for different groups 
of people. Furthermore, especially with respect to the analysis of the concept of deviance, 
this is also partly a study of marginalized groups and individuals. There is always a 
distinct tension in studies, where a non-marginalized, so called “normal”, privileged 




This setting has also been increasingly criticized especially from the field of disabled 
studies (for similar discussion in Finnish see for example Vehmas 2005, 136–140), and 
perhaps quite rightly so.  
However, this tensed up setting is also one of the reasons and justification of why I chose 
the theoretical research setting: The theoretical set up allows me to be more mindful about 
the divisions of normality and deviance, of “Us” and “Them”, and of the marginalized 
and the majority. With this theoretical positioning, I recognize that I am neither giving a 
voice, nor taking or distorting it from the silenced, marginalized and deviant individuals. 
Instead, I see this thesis as a study of the foundations of the societal discussion and 
discourses of deviance. Ironically enough, those foundations were primarily set by the 
non-deviant, non-marginalized majority of the society. Thus, it can be said that this thesis 
focuses more on the analysis and deconstruction of the dominant, general foundations.  
The fields of special education and disability studies, are highly normative and value-
laden sciences. I also believe, that in these fields, the aim is always to support and 
empower the deviant and the disabled people. Yet, it is important to acknowledge, that 
we can give support in many different ways. I have come up with at least three different 
ways: 1) by standing in front of the disadvantaged individual, sheltering and protecting 
them from harmful influences, 2) by standing with them, supporting their views and 
opinions, emphasizing equality and unity or 3) by standing behind the disadvantaged 
people, building the foundation and basis for them and for all of us to participate and feel 
included, and offering the tools and resources to advance the discussion and practices on 
their own terms. I feel that the traditional special education has widely concentrated on 
the first way, and thus, earned the critique of succumbing to paternalism. More modern 
studies on inclusion and deviance have explicitly tried to lean more towards the second 




the differences.  By this theoretical setting, I identify myself as contributing to the third 
way, by opening up the discussion and revealing the premises and definitions underneath 
the unclear and changing discourses and paradigms.  
 
4. NORMALITY AND DEVIANCE 
Normality can be defined in multiple different ways. That, which definition is chosen at 
any given time, depends on the context, background assumptions, and to what ends the 
concept is used for (Mercer 1973, 25, 32). So, it depends on what is the function of that 
concept in the discourse it is applied to at that time. This function, in turn, is often dictated 
by the primary purpose of the definition and the reason, why we feel the need to make 
the distinction between the normality and deviance in the first place. At times, both the 
contents of the definition and the reason behind choosing a certain definition over another, 
might be quite arbitrary (Ibid, 1–2). Especially in those cases, it is important to keep in 
mind the reasons and contexts behind the definition. In this chapter I briefly present the 
different ways of defining normality and examine the distinction between these 
definitions into normative and non-normative definitions of normality. Before going into 
this, however, I also briefly explain the problem of demarcation (suom. rajanveto-
ongelma) and arbitrariness of normality a bit further. Furthermore, I want to note that this 
chapter is loosely based on my earlier master’s thesis study in philosophy. The said thesis 
discussed the naturalistic fallacy (suom. naturalistinen virhepäätelmä) in medicalization, 
and some of the ideas in that thesis are also examined in this one by applicable parts (see 





4.1. THE DEMARCATION PROBLEM 
The term demarcation problem in philosophy refers to all such situations, where it is not 
unequivocally clear where, for example, some concept or property begins and ends, or 
where it ceases to exist or stay the same. In these cases, the outlines of such concepts or 
properties are often said to be “blurry”, “sliding” or flexible in a sense, that the 
demarcation is artificial and often based on other external reasons. (SEP, 2017.) To my 
understanding, “external reasons”, in this case, mean that the demarcation is not 
conceptual, ergo, the reasons for defining the boundaries of the concept to a certain point 
are not derived from the conceptual content of the concept itself. Instead, these reasons 
can be, for example, political or economic reasons. In any case, the reasons may wary 
and they can be more or less well-founded – or sometimes even totally unwarranted and 
fully arbitrary. In these cases, the outlining of a concept is motivated by personal or other 
irrelevant reasons. The concept of normality is an excellent example of such “blurry” 
concept, and the demarcation between normality and deviance is “sliding”, flexible and 
dependent on external motivations of demarcation. 
The arbitrariness and the problem of demarcation originate partly from the so called 
substantive hungry nature of normality. By the substantive hungry nature (suom. 
substantiivinälkäisyys) of normality a philosopher John Dupre (1998) means, that there 
is nothing normal per se. Because there is nothing intrinsically or ipso facto normal, there 
is no point in talking about normality, without first specifying, what “host” thing or 
phenomena we are talking about. This means, that we cannot talk about normality, 
without first stating, whose or what thing’s normality we are talking about. Therefore, the 
definition must always refer to a normal something: normal liver, normal weight, normal 
short-term memory or normal concentration span, for example. (Dupre, 1998.) According 




(and abnormality), and there is no point in talking about normality in itself, without first 
pointing out the subject of normality. Thus, normality in itself does not exist 
independently. (Ibid.) 
In my other master’s thesis, I went to greater lengths in examining the substantive hungry 
nature of normality, but in this current thesis it suffices to conclude, that the substantive 
hungry nature of normality often leads to speciesism (suom. lajiajattelu), and thereby to 
the demarcation problem by producing both too broad and too narrow definitions of 
normality. According to Dupre (1998), the requirement of specifying a target for 
normality leads to classification and categorization, in which normality is defined either 
by the specified, stereotypic proponent of a class or an artificial abstract prototype of a 
creature. This, in turn, more often than not, leads to stipulating some typical or natural 
distribution of characteristics or behavior in a given species. (Ibid.) At this point it is also 
worthwhile to notice, that both the concepts of species and naturalness are highly 
ambiguous and undefined. Especially the concept of naturalness is, if possible, even more 
unclear than the concept of normality and has many hidden normative connotations (for 
further discussion see Siipi 2008; Siipi 2004). Therefore, these concepts actually only 
make it harder to define normality in an unambiguous fashion.  
When we need to resort to speciesism and categorization, the definitions of normality are 
constantly either too broad or too narrow. This is the result of different degrees of 
variation between properties inside the same species or population, and between different 
species or populations. It is perfectly possible, that in some cases the natural variation in 
a certain property of a given species is actually greater inside that species, than it is over 
two different species. Consequently, the substantive hungry nature of normality ends up 
producing too narrow definitions, when it determines the outlines of normality based on 




large inside one population. At the same time the definition of normality, denominating 
a single category (like species) as its target, might also be too broad, because other factors, 
like age, gender and ancestry, could also be important when stipulating normality. (Dupre 
1998.) 
Let’s take ovulation as an example of this problem: 
Ovulation, ergo the detachment of the egg cell, is normal for our species. It 
can be said, that it is normal for humans to ovulate: It happens naturally, it 
is part of the normal functioning of the ovaries, as well as a prerequisite of 
conception and becoming pregnant, which is the usual (if not the only) way 
for our species, as mammals, to reproduce. However, firstly, this is a too 
broad definition of normality, because it only applies to one gender of the 
species, and only to those individuals in it, who belong to a certain, quite 
restricted, age group and physical fitness and constitution. Secondly, note, 
that at the same time the definition is also too narrow, as it excludes all the 
other mammal species altogether, though it is just as normal for them to 
ovulate, as it is for the human species.  
 
Even if we feel that there could be a way of defining normality in a satisfactory way 
without confusing the concepts of normality and naturalness Dupre’s notions are 
beneficial and important in determining, how useful it is, in the first place, to even assign 
normality to anyone or anything. If we were to take Dupre’s thoughts seriously, should 
we then only use normality assigned straight to the individual person or thing we are at 
that exact moment talking about. And if we can only assign normality individually, case 




redundant. All that is left to say then, seems to be, that all individuals are different and 
special in some way.  
Although this may be true, the way I see it, there are two problems with this. Firstly, also 
individuals change through time and context. For example, some things that were normal 
for me as a baby, now would be considered extremely abnormal. Also, some things that 
are now within my normal competence and abilities, will not be possible for me in sixty 
years, although that will then also be normal for me at that time. Secondly, it seems, that 
the way we use the concept of normality makes it almost necessarily a comparative term. 
For a meaningful and interesting comparison, we need to be able to say something about 
normality either regarding a group of at least some statistical value or in contrast with 
some other opposing phenomena, individual or thing. On the other hand, we can also use 
the term free of any statistical claims in comparison to other proximate interface concepts, 
like deviance and abnormality. These observations bring us to the introduction of 
different ways of defining normality. 
 
4.2. NORMATIVE AND NON-NORMATIVE NORMALITY 
There are many ways of understanding and defining normality. Different definitions and 
uses of the term carry different connotations and implications. This diversity in meaning 
and connotation may lead to misunderstandings in discussions, where the parties 
unknowingly use different conceptions of normality. (Soan 2012, 91–92; Cornwall 2012.) 
In this thesis, I will introduce four different uses and meanings of normality. These may 
not be the only possible definitions there are, but I examine these in detail, as they are the 
four most relevant definitions to our current subjects of inclusion and medicalization. I 




the attention to normative and non-normative connotations of different definitions of 
normality.  
The definitions of normality can be divided into normative and non-normative 
definitions. Non-normative definitions of normality state, what is most common or typical 
in the population. Normative definitions, in turn, state, what is good or how things should 
be. So, by non-normative definitions we want to stipulate the average, the mean, the most 
common state of affairs, without saying anything else about the state of affairs. By 
normative definitions, on the other hand, we want to stipulate, that a given state of affairs 
is good or desirable, even an ideal. (Mercer 1973, 7–8.) The normative definition, in turn, 
is said to be a value-laden term (suom. arvolatautunut käsite). That is to say that, that 
which we think of as normatively normal, is in part dictated by our personal values and 
the norms of our society. The norms and values of people and society are, in turn, molded 
by their culture, custom, time and place, and will change accordingly, like we will see 
later on in chapter 4. (see for example Conrad & Schneider 1992.) Note that, that which 
is normatively normal might not be common at all. It means, that something may not be 
statistically normal, although it would be desirable, as in, normal in the normative sense. 
On the other hand, it can also be the other way around; That which is non-normatively 
normal, as in, usual, might not be desirable or good. Even further, sometimes they may 
also be the same; That, which is common is also good and desirable. This might actually 
be the most common case, especially with many health and mental health related 
conditions. A few examples to clarify all of these situations: 
1) The language genius: 
It would be highly desirable to learn a new language right away, just by reading 
through all the grammar rules and a few dictionaries, without the need to cram 




Instead, you would be ready to go and babble on after a few hours of reading. In 
fact, you could learn the country’s language on a flight over there and as you touch 
down, you would be ready to speak as a local native person. Sounds ideal, but this 
is not normal by any means, and doubtfully even possible. 
 
2) The yeast infection:  
Yeast infection is a highly common ailment, especially in the mouth. It has been 
estimated that the majority of people actually have the yeast bacteria Candida 
albicans in their mouth. Although not perilous, of course, this is not an ideal 
condition either, as it can cause unpleasant symptoms, like pain, a burning 
sensation in the mouth and bad breath. Thus, although it is very common and 
typical, and in that sense quite normal, it is by no means ideal to have a yeast 
infection.  
 
3)  Psychological adaptations: 
(A) The overwhelming majority of people have a typical working memory range 
of 5 to 9 units. This is the statistically normal working memory capacity and a 
deviation from this range is almost always caused by some neurological condition, 
progressive degenerative illness or head trauma. To function satisfactorily and to 
live independently with a working memory of 2 or 3 units is undoubtedly hard, if 
not impossible – at the very least clearly not ideal. However, also a working 
memory capacity of, say 100 or 1000 units could be quite painful and frustrating, 
as it would be impossible or hard, to let irrelevant information go adaptively. So, 
in the end, it would not be ideal to have a large or infinite working memory 
capacity. It may quite well be that the 7 units, give or take 2 units, is quite as ideal, 




(B) People’s moods vary somewhat: sometimes we are happy, sometimes sad, 
anxious or enthusiastic. However, people’s moods are typically somewhere in 
between the two extremes, we are seldom extremely happy or extremely sad, and 
usually not for a long time either. We are almost always somewhere in between; 
we are mostly OK. Of course, it goes without saying that it is less than ideal to be 
extremely sad for long periods of time. However, constant happiness may not be 
unequivocally desirable either. When extremely happy and carefree we tend to be 
less cautious, for example, taking more risks and ignoring warning stimulus, or 
less emphatic to other people’s problems or sorrow. It has even been argued that 
it is not physically possible to be extremely happy all the time, as extreme 
emotions take up so much energy, be they positive or negative. Thus, we would 
burn out sooner or later. So, the typical in-between, OK mood may also be the 
most ideal state to be in, for the majority of time at least. 
Consequently, we notice that there could be a connection between that, which is typical 
and that, which is regarded as desirable. Sometimes the norm depends on how things 
would be anyway – we want to preserve the status quo. But how can we distinguish 
between what is normal in a neutral sense, and what is an ideal notion of normality? 
Philosophers Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu (2012) introduce the concept of harm 
(suom. haitta) as a tool for making these distinctions. Kahane and Savulescu separate the 
definitions of normality and deviance from the definitions of ideals. They argue, that it is 
normal, in a neutral sense, for people to have a given set of statistically common 
prerequisites, so that they are not lacking in any such typical human abilities and 
properties, which would make their life somehow significantly worse, or cause them harm 
with respect to others. In turn, it would be abnormal to be lacking or deprived of these 




inequality between them and other people. Such abnormal states could be, for example, 
blindness or quadriplegia. Kahane and Savulescu also state, that as such states cause 
people harm, we should try and aim to eliminate and cure these harmful states. (Kahane 
& Savulescu 2012, 318–322.)  
Ideals, on the other hand, exceed the neutral normality; They are something extra or 
something better than the average. This seems quite plausible. Kahane and Savulesu 
(2012) also state, that there does not seem to be any moral obligation to guarantee ideal 
abilities or traits to anyone. For example, it might well be ideal to have the IQ of 160, 
exceptional artistic talents or life expectancy of 200 years. Furthermore, in a sense, it 
might even be considered inconvenient to lack these abilities in comparison of possessing 
them, but it still does not compel the individual or the society to find a cure for mediocrity. 
Thus, it is thought that mediocrity, or typical set of talents and skills, does not produce 
harm. (Ibid., 319.) 
So, striving for the ideal and alleviating harm seem to be morally different situations. For 
example, not being super talented may only rob the person of some extra advantages, 
whereas a disability can actually cause harm. The actual harm caused by the disability 
generates the moral obligation for others to try and remove, or at least minimize that harm, 
so that everyone would have the same possibilities and equal opportunities. Then again, 
striving for the ideal special talents does not compel action in the same extent, at least not 
from the part of the society towards helping the individual in their personal perfectionist 
aims. (Ibid., 318–325.) It may be noted here, that these notions are related to the luck 
egalitarian views on distributive justice. According to luck egalitarianism (suom. 
sattumaegalitarianismi), it is morally wrong, that some should suffer with respect to 




Although many of the points made by Kahane and Savulescu appear quite plausible and 
intuitive, I present a possible critique to their views. Kahane’s and Savulescu’s view 
seems to be based and focused on a notion of disabled people lacking in some 
fundamental skills. It can be questioned, how constructive and genuinely empowering 
such a negatively constructed view could be, and how it could even negatively impact the 
self-image of disabled people (Hahn 1994, cited in Lipsky & Gartner 1996, 776) feeding 
into learned helplessness and other such byproducts of the traditional paternalistic 
thinking (Lipsky & Gartner 1996, 763–764). Instead, we so called normal people maybe 
need a new perspective, where we would understand that disabled or deviant people are 
not lacking or missing anything but rather, they are just different to some extent in some 
respects. Also, them being different does not necessarily mean that they are totally and 
profoundly different. (Ibid., 777.) 
As we have seen here already, the definition of normality depends on the context, 
preconceptions and values. Different definitions in turn influence the way we relate to 
normality and deviance, and how we treat the people we deem normal or deviant. First 
two definitions of normality I am going to examine next, fall primarily into the non-
normative definitions of normality, and they are the most important normality 
conceptions in the medicalization paradigm. The last two definitions of normality are 
more prominent in the inclusion debate, and they lean more towards the normative 
definitions of normality. 
 
4.3. STATISTICAL NORMALITY 
Statistical normality denotes simply the typical or the general, ergo that which is close to 




normality is, in a sense, quite straightforward, as it is purely a mathematical, numerical 
attribute. According to its name, statistical normality is a statistical term, and in statistics 
normality is defined through the Gauss curve, ergo, the bell curve (suom. Gaussin käyrä, 
normaalijakauma). The bell curve is a graph of a symmetrical distribution, where 
statistical normality is found on the mounting center of the curve. (Gräsbeck 1995, 66; 
Mercer 1973, 3–4.) In a symmetrical distribution, like the bell curve, the population mean, 
mode and median are equal. In other words, the mean really is both the centermost and 
the most typical value in the population. If the distribution would be cut in half through 
the middle, half of the observational values would be on the right side and an equal half 
would stay on the left side symmetrically. This also means, that exactly half of the values 
on the distribution are smaller than the mean, and half are bigger than the mean. In a bell 
curve 95% of the observational values are located only two standard deviations (SD) 
(suom. keskihajonta) away from the mean. Consequently, both, the really big and the 
really small values, are rare in this distribution. (Mercer 1973, 3–7; Nummenmaa 2009, 
129–130.)  
All such phenomena and properties, in which the observational values are free to variate 
up and down, conform to the bell curve. When such properties are numerically measured 
multiple times, the distribution of the measurement results will eventually start to follow 
the shape of the bell curve. A property is thought to follow the normal distribution, 
whenever the property is caused by more than one factor. Whenever multiple factors have 
an effect on the manifestation of the property or phenomena, that property or phenomena 
will be symmetrically distributed (given that it is free to variate), be it a property of nature 
or of human behavior. (Nummenmaa 2009, 129–130.) By this remark, the statistical 
principles of normality have also come to be applied on social sciences and the societal 




behavior is such, that it is generated by more than a single factor. These phenomena are 
often referred to as multiple factor phenomena. (Nummenmaa 2009, Gräsbeck 1995.) 
Although the statistical definition of normality seems explicit and reliable, it becomes 
problematic when it is applied to measurements, which are not truly equally distributed, 
although they may first seem so on the surface. In a matter of fact, although almost all 
social and human phenomena are generated by multiple factors, they do not fully qualify 
as bell curve distributions. This results from the fact, that most human and social 
properties are actually not perfectly free to variate. They cannot variate endlessly up and 
down. This fact usually manifests as an impossibility of these properties to have smaller 
values than 0. (Gräsbeck 1995, 71.) Moreover, these values often also have at least a 
practical maximum as well. 
Let’s take height as an example of these restrictions: 
Height is one of the easiest human properties to measure numerically. It is, 
per se, a numeric property, and on the surface, it certainly seems to follow 
the bell curve and normal distribution. Both extremely tall and extremely 
short measurements are rare, and so, also often thought to be caused by 
some developmental abnormality. However, the variation of the height is 
not completely free. It is simply not possible for any (living, already born) 
human being to be only two centimeters long, for example. So, height 
cannot actually get values of only few centimeters, let alone smaller than 
zero – that is to say, negative values of height (like -30 cm long). The same 
goes for the top of the scale; huge values are practically impossible. In fact, 
with height the top is reached quite quickly. For example, a ten meters long 




alone, say, ten kilometers long person.  
 
Of course, the situation only gets more complicated when we measure traits, which are 
not outright numerically measurable. Such traits need to be operationalized first, meaning 
that they have to be converted into a numeric form. A good example of such 
operationalized trait is intelligence. Intelligence is measured by points and expressed by 
the intelligence quotient (IQ) (suom. älykkyysosamäärä, ÄO). The distribution of IQ 
points can be placed on a bell curve, with the result of 100 points as the mean value. 
However, this is only an illusion, because intelligence, any more than height, is not free 
to variate endlessly. For example, IQ scores of less than 0 are impossible. Both the 
measurement, the quotient and the symmetrical distribution of scores is completely man-
made, artificial and forced. (Mercer 1973, 5, 130.) 
All in all, statistical normality in itself may be a clear and functional concept, but 
problems arise when we attach normative value judgements or social opinions to it. This 
is a well-known deduction error in philosophy, and it is often called Hume’s guillotine or 
the is-ought-gap. According to the famous enlightenment philosopher, David Hume 
(2000), one must not infer, how things should be, solely based on how they actually are. 
Thus, there is a gap between the descriptive reality and the normative statement, and this 
gap cannot be overcome by solely describing the states of affairs in reality. To cross the 
gap in a logically valid way, one must also provide normative, in other words, value-
laden, premises. (Hume 2000, 3.1.1.27; Norton 2000, in Hume 2000, 178.) I have 
examined this error in medicalization more profoundly and extensively in my earlier 
master’s thesis (see Puumala 2017). 




called healthy individuals were most often found to get measurement results, that would 
be located in the centermost area of the normal distribution’s bell curve. In other words, 
they would get the so called “normal” values, in a statistical sense. Most of the population 
are comparatively healthy, so the majority will understandably get these mean values. In 
turn, some few individuals will get very rare values located on both far ends of the 
continuum. These rare values started to be seen as the opposite of healthy, therefore 
pathological, although, as a matter of fact, they are just uncommon or rare. (Gräsbeck 
1995, 69; Mercer 1973, 2–7.)  
So, the distribution in itself does not imply, that the values in the middle of the curve are 
somehow good, correct or ideal values. On the contrary, the bell curve is a completely 
value-neutral, symmetrically curved line on a paper. The value-laden aspect is man-made. 
This man-made deduction error occurs, because we imperceptibly start to think, that these 
typical values must be natural and somehow ideal, the way they should be. The rare 
values then are seen as anomalies and deviances from this nature-intended golden mean. 
(Gräsback 1995, 69.) Of course, when we think about it rationally, it is clear, that nature 
does not intend anything, and there are no “correct values”, from which the deviation 
would be “an error” in the natural order. In a matter of fact, not even nearly all properties 
related to sickness and health follow the normal distribution. And on the other hand, it is 
not always desirable to be located in the middle of the curve, in terms of some properties 
concerning sickness and health. For example, dental caries and high blood pressure are 
statistically normal in that they are very common, especially in all the western 
populations. However, they are both also pathological and potentially quite dangerous 
conditions, too, as they can even lead to more severe and even potentially lethal 
conditions, like heart attack and inflammation of the pericardium.  




on/off-conditions, so the amount of that characteristic does not vary at all – it either exists 
or it does not. (Launis & Räikkä 1995, 81–84) Actually, this seems to be the case in 
almost all traditionally medical conditions. For example, the test result for chlamydia is 
either negative or positive, not somewhere in between. Also, there are no such things as 
borderline pancreatic cancer or an averagely broken shinbone. Later on, we will see, that 
this is not necessarily the case regarding the fields of psychology and psychiatry, where 
medicalization is said to advance most rapidly at the moment (Conrad & Schneider 1992; 
Watters 2010; Szasz 1974). Paradoxically, however, medicalization most often uses the 
statistical view of normality especially when categorizing mental states and behavior as 
normal or deviant (Mercer 1973, 7–8).  
 
4.4. BIOFUNCTIONAL NORMALITY 
A better way to define medical normality and conditions regarding sickness and health is 
to define them through the biological constitution and/or function they have. In the 
functional definition normality is specified by certain specific capabilities and functions 
the organism or part of the organism has. (Launis & Räikkä 1995, 81–84). Along with 
statistical normality, biofunctional normality is the other most dominant view of 
normality in the medicalization paradigm (Mercer 1973, 7–8). Once again, this definition 
converges to some kind of species thinking, where it is thought, that some capabilities 
and capacities are significant for certain species- or organism-typical behavior or 
function. This definition also automatically implies more normative statements than 
statistical normality, as in the functional view we often see deviation or abnormality as 
some kind of deficit or weakness. The presence of some basic capabilities is related to our 
views on ideal or at least adequate health. (Dupre 1998, 4.) Some functionally normal 




the ability to communicate verbally through speech. Functional normality can also be 
perceived on an organ level. For example, a normal heart is such that it pumps enough 
blood in a sufficiently regular basis throughout the whole body. Else, if these abilities and 
functions are lacking, we typically think that the organ is not only statistically unusual, 
but also defective and faulty – sometimes even to a lethal extent. (Launis & Räikkä 1995, 
82–83.) 
By concentrating on the abilities and functions, the functional conception of normality 
must also take into account the connections between the abilities and the environment. It 
seems that with every ability, environmental factors have at least some effect on the extent 
to which these abilities can be used, and the way they manifest themselves. Normal 
functional abilities can be divided into relational abilities and intrinsic abilities (Dupre 
1998, 4.) For example, the ability to move your fingers volitionally is an intrinsic ability, 
it is an ability in itself. In turn, the ability to cut a circle from a piece of paper is a relational 
capacity, as other factors, including the intrinsic ability to move your fingers, the 
availability of good scissors and visual contact with the scissors and the paper, greatly 
affect the manifestation of the ability. Thus, all the relational capacities depend on other 
intrinsic capacities. Yet those intrinsic capacities alone do not suffice either; a favorable 
environment and certain working conditions are also needed. (Ibid.) On the other hand, it 
is noteworthy, that if the environment and conditions are favorable, some such abilities, 
which the person usually lacks, can also become possible. For example, a person who 
normally does not have sufficient control over their larynx or tongue muscles, usually 
cannot communicate verbally. However, through specific technological aids it can 
become possible for them, too.  
So, it would seem that, that which is regarded as normal behavior or normal set of 




hand, how we can utilize the environmental conditions to make the most out of our 
relational capacities. So, it is also interesting to examine, which of these capacities carry 
more importance in our social opinions on normality. Should we regard as normal only 
those individuals, who have the ideal intrinsic capacities? Or would it be enough to be 
able to perform, even with some possible external aids, the functions associated with the 
intrinsic capacities? Dupre (1998) points out, that actually also the majority of the so 
called normal abilities the normal people possess, are also dependent on the 
environmental conditions. For example, our ability to walk upright without stumbling is 
extremely good in modern paved city roads, but it quickly deteriorates when we have to 
walk in the rocky, wet jungle terrain. (Ibid., 5.) In conclusion, I would say that it is the 
outcome that matters the most. For me, the real question is, if we can, in the end, perform 
a certain function well enough or not.  
The skills in themselves, or the amount of help and external aids we need to achieve the 
wanted end result does not seem to matter much from the perspective of the wanted 
outcome. Therefore, I find it quite problematic, that this seems to be the other way around 
in our modern medicalized society and schooling system. As the intrinsic capacities are 
all more or less biological abilities and features, the medical framework will always 
define the lack of these abilities as deficits and deprivation, which in turn are pathological 
and abnormal conditions, regardless the performances the person is nonetheless capable 
of doing. In the social constructivist models of disability, it is often stated, that the most 
harmful effects of the disabilities are brought about, not by the handicap in itself, but by 
the environment, social arrangements and the attitudes of other people. (Vehmas 2005, 
124–140; Lipsky & Gartner 1996, 777, 789.) The medical model, on the contrary sees the 
deviance as pathology, and the pathology is always in the individual (Mercer 1973, 7.) If, 




walking with their own two feet. Therefore, according to the medical model, he or she is 
abnormal, irrespective of whether they can still move with an aid, for example with a 
wheelchair. In the medical view, the aid is only a symptomatic treatment (suom. 
oireenmukainen hoito) to the pathological condition of immobility. (Skrtic 1991, 150–
152 cited in Lipsky & Gartner 1996, 777.)  
Also, it is important to remember, that our society and environment have been formed 
over a long period of time and often quite arbitrarily. Or rather, to the direction the 
majority and the dominant culture have dictated. For this, different times, cultures and 
continents offer different environments. On the other hand, the changes can be also quick 
and consciously made, to be better suited for everyone’s abilities. For example, by 
building ramps and wider doorways we are making everyday life so much easier for the 
people in wheelchairs, without in any way complicating things for the walking people. 
 
4.5. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL NORMALITY 
By social psychological normality I mean our conceptions on what is socially acceptable 
and desirable behavior, and what are the psychologically normal or understandable ways 
of reacting to certain situations. I coined this term in my earlier thesis (see Puumala 2017) 
to differentiate it from the more biologically orientated functional normality, but also, to 
differentiate it from mere social normality. Social psychological normality most often has 
to do with the psychological behavior, abilities and reactions. Both statistical and 
functional normality are mainly non-normative definitions of normality, and both, for the 
most part at least, are quite easily measurable concepts. Jane Mercer (1973), for example 
states that pathology (ergo bio functional abnormality) is universal in a sense that they 




valvular defect (suom. sydämen läppävika) and the surgery to mend it are essentially the 
same in Finland as it is in, say, China, Ghana and Argentina.  
Social psychological normality, on the other hand, is something quite totally different. 
Our conceptions of social and psychological normality are strongly culturally and 
contextually bound, and therefore often quite problematic and arbitrary. Our normative 
conceptions on what is socially appropriate behavior, and our expectations about other 
people and the way they will, or should, act in certain situations are determined by the 
norms of the society we live in. (Wachbroit 2003, 52–54.) This results in differences and 
nuances in the characteristics and manifestations of most social psychological 
abnormalities across cultures. Watters (2010), for example has written about differences 
in the manifestation of depression between the American and Japanese psyches, or 
differences in the meaning of anorexia between American and Chinese cultures. 
It can be said that social psychological conceptions of normality are based on the 
stereotypical preconceptions we have of the everyday-life situations and how they 
normally unfold, or how they should go, and how the people acting in them should be 
able to behave. If we time and time again fail to fulfill this stereotype or conform to the 
norms in the society, we will be labelled as deviant or abnormal, at least as to that 
particular behavior.  
To clarify, I will give a couple of examples: 
1) The saluter: 
In probably all the cultures in the world, it is common conduct to first 
introduce yourself by name to people you meet for the first time. In the 
western countries, this is often done by shaking hands at the same time. 




regarded as quite rude. So, that would be at least a little deviant. On the 
other hand, if I would walk the streets introducing myself and shaking 
hands with every single new passer-by I come across, my behavior 
would be regarded extremely abnormal, maybe even as a sign of a 
severe mental illness.  
 
2) The dinner date: 
We all have a stereotype in our heads of a typical dinner in a restaurant: 
You sit at the table, the waitress comes, you order the food, eat and chat 
with your friend, pay the bill and leave. In this order, for the most part. 
Actually, a failure to do any of these would be regarded as deviant or 
abnormal, some of these even illegal. Imagine that on a dinner date your 
friend cannot sit at the table for more than ten minutes, then stands up, 
starts to scream mimicking bird noises and waving her hands at the sides 
of her head, while walking around in small circles. Now that would be 
highly unusual. Most people would call her “crazy”. 
 
With these examples, we can also see that there might be different degrees of social 
psychological normality unlike in functional normality, where many definitions are 
categorical, on/off-characteristics. That could be one of the reasons why the social 
psychological normality seems to be so ambiguous and unclear. It can include established 
habits and social manners, as well as cultural, institutional and even ethical norms. Social 
psychological normality is highly dependent on environmental and cultural factors and 
its boundaries wary according to time, space and culture. (Wachbroit 1994, 580.) Thus, 




culture at the moment, or even in this culture in a few-hundred-year’s-time. As it is so 
dependent on many environmental factors, it is extremely hard to say anything general 
about social psychological normality. It is a dynamic conception on what people find 
acceptable and what they find insulting in given situations.  
 
4.6. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST NORMALITY 
The social constructivist definition of normality is the most value-aware of these 
definitions of normality. It suggests that judgements of normality and deviance are first 
and foremost value-laden statements. According to the social constructionist model, 
normality and deviance are not objective, independent states of affairs, but rather 
culturally constructed phenomena. Conceptions about normality and deviance are based 
on the values of the society. (Conrad & Schneider 1992.) This means that it is logically 
impossible to determine their objective truth-value. This, in turn, leads to relativism 
concerning the contents of the concepts of deviance and normality. This can easily be 
observed in reality in different and changing, culture and time dependent definitions of 
normality. Therefore, normality, abnormality and deviance are labels, that are primarily 
represented in the minds and discourses of those people, who describe them onto others, 
and not in the objective reality per se. (Launis & Räikkä 1995, 85–90; Vehmas 2005, 
121–124.)  
The social constructivist model abandons the view, that there would necessarily be 
something wrong with the deviant person himself, but rather construes deviance as a 
statement about the cultural and social norms of the persons environment. Social 
constructivist views acknowledge that our cultures are based on values, opinions and 




normality. Therefore, these attitudes are inclined on discriminating against deviance and 
abnormality. (Vehmas 2005, 110, 112, 116–117.) Of course, no one is raised in a vacuum, 
and so the surrounding society has an impact in all of our abilities and the interpretations 
they are given. Thus, in social constructivist definitions normality or deviance is not 
determined by some set biological or functional properties or abilities, but rather they are 
seen as generated by some social arrangements, attitudes and values. Consequently, the 
labelling of deviant, abnormal, sick or disabled people is also seen as something similar 
to other forms of discrimination, like homophobia or racism. All the cultures tend to 
develop different superstitions or myths about deviance and disability, because they give 
a name to the fear the so called normal people have over disabled or abnormal bodies and 
minds. This way the conceptions of normality and health, deviance, abnormality and 
sickness, help the normal people to draw a line between them and the deviant people – 
the Others. (Launis & Räikkä 1995, 85–90; Vehmas 2005, 121–124.) To me, the biggest 
difference between social psychological and social constructivist definitions is the way 
the social constructivist definitions of normality take the social control and power, as well 
as the cultural connotations, even better and more explicitly into account, when describing 
the process of assigning deviance to some people and normality to some others. Although 
social psychological normality also recognizes certain amount of relativism in assigning 
normality, it may still regard social psychological deviation as pathology – 
psychopathology, more precisely. 
The social constructivist conceptions do not necessarily deny the impact that biological 
aberrations may have on the individual’s life, but the focus is more on the social and 
political factors, that can be much more disabling to the person, than his or her handicap 
in itself. Social constructivist definitions make a separation of impairments (suom. 




organic aberrations, whereas disability refers to the social situation, which makes the 
impairment harmful or challenging. The idea is, that organic impairment alone rarely 
produces disability, but disability is produced in interaction with the culture and social 
environment which discriminates against the individual’s biophysical, psychological or 
cognitive impairments. (Vehmas 2005, 110, 115.) The history of normality and deviance 
is very much a history of discrimination (see Conrad & Schneider 1992; Vehmas 2005, 
75). Next, I will turn to examine the history of these concepts, and I will briefly touch on 
the different practical suggestions these changing definitions have had in our society and 
culture in the past. 
 
5. THE HISTORY OF NORMALITY AND DEVIANCE 
The way we understand the reasons of deviance strongly influence the way we react and 
relate to deviance and normality and the people labelled as such. Roughly generalizing, 
it can be said that the conceptions of normality and deviance have shifted from 
superstitious, to moralistic to scientific conceptions. Originally, the conceptions of 
normality and deviance were dictated by religion and myths. Attitudes toward deviance 
and abnormality were strongly superstitious. For example, all through the middle ages 
deviance, disability and mental disorders were seen as signs of sin, and so, either as the 
punishment from God or the possession of the Devil. Hence, also the attitudes towards 
these individuals were strongly religious or moralistic, but also two-fold. On the one hand, 
the deviant people had to face a lot of hatred and prejudice, which often also led to violent 
acts and even persecution, like the famous witch hunts of the middle ages. On the other 
hand, the deviant and disabled were a way for the normal people to practice the acts of 
clemency and compassion, like giving alms, which in turn would make the benefactor 




Vehmas 2005, 24–44.) Also, it may be noted, that almost all cultures recognize some 
acceptable or desirable forms of deviance. For example, different prophets and shamans 
have always been quite esteemed and admired, although they are highly unusual and 
deviant people and the explanation of their deviance has been supernatural and religious 
just as well. Only instead of a punishment or sin, their deviance was seen as a gift from 
above. (Conrad & Schneider 1992, 39.) Thus, that what is seen as an adverse deviance 
does not depend only on the deviant property itself, but on the interplay of that property 
and the environment or the community where it manifests. This interplay between the 
property and the culture determines how the deviance is understood, and if it is ultimately 
deemed negative or positive. (Zola 1966, 618.) 
The Renaissance, and especially the age of Enlightenment, brought back the scientific 
world view that had started developing in the Antiquity, with the humorism (suom. 
humoraalioppi) and other such theories. Naturally, this also changed the definitions of, 
and attitudes towards normality and deviance. The shift from the agrarian society towards 
industrialization produced two new division in the definition of deviance. Firstly, the so 
called able-bodied were to be divided from those who could not work. Secondly, the so 
called “lunatics” were to be divided from the otherwise merely bodily handicapped 
people. Those who were non-able-bodied lunatics were strictly, and often violently, 
confined into institutions called hospices, as though out of the way of the society. 
Otherwise handicapped people also often lived in such institutions, although they were 
not necessarily deemed as totally incapable of any work. In the 18th century the lunatics 
and the handicapped or otherwise ill people were separated into different institutions, so 
as to prevent the “lunacy” from transmitting to the sane. (Conrad & Schneider 1992, 39–
45.) 




handicapped, too. As the industrialization advanced, the ability to work became the 
indicator of the person’s value to the society. If that value for some reason was low, they 
were entirely excluded from the society, and thus began the segregation and 
institutionalization of deviant people. Bodily or mentally deviant people were not only 
seen as non-profitable, but also as harmful for the whole society. The deviant people at 
the time were seen as morally divergent, as if some kind of criminals, or at least as 
disturbers of the social peace and order. So, the hospices were used as direct and concrete 
devices of social control and power. The inhabitants were not treated or rehabilitated in 
any way, as the institutions existed primarily to guard the normal people against the 
detrimental effects of deviant influences. (Conrad & Schneider 1992, 44–47; Vehmas 
2005, 53–57.)  
All the same, the effects of the medical treatment or rehabilitation of that time, may well 
have been more injurious than advantageous for the patients. Medical advancements, 
right until the 20th century, were painstakingly slow. Usually the doctors would not 
actually have any concrete knowledge over mental illness or disability, or how to cope 
with them. Although “the treatment” was most often just physical confinement and/or 
social control, terms like treatment, cure, medicine, patient and illness were still already 
used. (Conrad & Schneider 1992, 45–48; Vehmas 2005, 56–59.) However, the scientism 
of the Enlightenment, generated a strong belief that (medical) science will eventually have 
all the answers to any and all human problems. Thus, it can be crudely generalized, that 
medicalization of deviance was initiated by science optimism and semantic tricks, that 
are very much alive to this day. Next, I will turn to a deeper analysis of the modern-day 
medicalization and its consequences. 
6. MEDICALIZATION 




medical when it is understood, explained and treated with the terms and interventions of 
medical science. Historically, the evolution of the norms of our society has led to 
medicine becoming the most dominant field of explanation for human social phenomena: 
Our personal problems as well as our whole society is being medicalized. This means that 
certain types of behavior and certain properties come to be redefined in medical terms, 
although they may not have been seen as medical phenomena ever before. Thus, they 
become examined and treated in medical means. So, also the attitudes and problem 
solving becomes redefined as medical interventions and medical (pharmacological) 
treatment. This also reflects to the language we use. Terms such as healthy, sick, ill, 
normal, abnormal, deviant and pathological become important in describing the spectrum 
of human existence. (Zola 1972, 492–497; Conrad 1992, 209– 212, 214–223; Mercer 
1973, 16.) Examples of this development are the medicalization and medical treatment of 
alcoholism, ADHD and depression, among others. 
Medicalization is a fashionable topic in popular writings and discussions, too (for popular 
discussions in Finnish see for example: https://www.rapport.fi/journalistit/jani-kaaro/too-
much-medicine-special-nain-normaali-patologisoidaan?rs=art_355207&rsd=13298.) In 
lay-man terms, medicalization is often used to refer to unwanted medicalization or over 
medicalization. This means that people sense medicalization is taking over such fields of 
human life, it for some reason should not. In these cases, the attitude towards 
medicalization is often negative and prejudiced. It may well be true, that in some cases 
over medicalization has actually happened or will happen in the future, but the 
medicalization term does not necessarily have this negative connotation in itself. The term 
is used to describe any and all medical advancements, from which most part is extremely 
positive, lifesaving and enormously praiseworthy. (Conrad 1992, 209–211.) Thus, it is 




by-pass surgery, and to allegedly over diagnose and over medicate young boys with 
ADHD. 
According to sociologist Peter Conrad (1992, 209–213, 223) medicalization is first and 
foremost a question of definition. Everything starts with the medical lingo and 
understanding the phenomenon in medical terms and through the medical framework, 
then describing the individual and their problem with medical concepts and diagnosis, 
and finally applying medical methods for solving the problem. The individual becomes a 
patient, the problem becomes an illness and the solution becomes a treatment or cure, 
most often medication. (Ibid.) 
Like Peter Conrad (1992), another famous medicalization researcher, philosopher Irving 
Kenneth Zola (1972) argues, that medicalization is a form of social control. As a social 
framework, medicalization has replaced the religious and secular moralistic frameworks 
of before. In a way, medicalization can appear a lot more humane way to face human 
deviance, than these two earlier ones. However, Zola and Conrad point out, that the aim 
of these different orientations is the same, in that they all attempt to erase and abolish 
deviance. Of course, the means to that end are different and even contradictory depending 
on the viewpoint. You can choose from praying, punishing and medicating. (Conrad 
1992, 213–218; Zola 1972, 492–499.) 
The way we relate to the concept of medicalization and its practical advancements 
depends on the way we understand the definitions of sickness and health. Veikko Launis 
and Juha Räikkä (1995) present a division of naturalistic and normative conceptions of 
sickness. These roughly correspond to the statistical and normative notions of normality. 
Naturalistic view of sickness does not need any normative statements. In this view 




natural sciences reveal which states are illnesses and which are not. Therefore, in the 
naturalistic view, illness is most often seen as a dysfunction of the given organism or 
some organ of the organism. The optimal function of the organism, in turn, is a purely 
biological matter. Thus, the definition is also value-free, as sickness and health are seen 
as real, objective and independently existing states of affairs in reality. (Ibid., 81–85.) 
Note, that this corresponds most closely to the bio functional view of normality. 
Most proponents of medicalization take this viewpoint. Many medical professionals, for 
example, think of illnesses and deviances as objective, naturalistic facts, which are 
discovered by the science of medicine. These deviances and illnesses exist regardless of 
our knowledge of them and can be ignored or found and brought to attention.  This way, 
as medicine advances we will little by little become enlightened about certain conditions 
being illnesses, although we did not realize it before. As the objective act of diagnosing 
advances and develops, it will reveal new illnesses, and thus, it will only be a question of 
time, when all the sicknesses and their cures will be found through the scientific method. 
(Mercer 1973, 16; Skrtic 1991, 150–152 cited in Lipsky & Gartner 1996, 777.) 
On the other hand, according to the normative view of sickness, there are always at least 
some normative notions included in the definition of states as illnesses (Launis & Räikkä 
1995, 85). Like we already saw with the social psychological and social constructivist 
definitions of normality, such normative notions can, for example, be the concepts of 
harm or extra advantage. Furthermore, like noted earlier, that which is harmful or 
advantageous to the organism can be individual or depend on the environment. Thus, it 
is not, at least not fully, definable in purely objective, biological terms. Also, Launis and 
Räikkä (1995) note, that we cannot deem all harmful properties as illnesses either, or else 
we will have quite an arbitrary definition of sickness on our hands yet again. Instead, the 




Still, in the normative view of illness, the definition of illness is seen as, at least to some 
extent, value-laden concept, and so, not totally objective and neutral. Often the value of 
health is understood negatively, in a way that the lack of health is regarded a bad thing. 
Thus, we learn to appreciate and give value to health, when we notice that it is missing, 
or it has become threatened. (Launis 2007, 24.) So, the notions of sickness and health 
depend, at least to an extent, on our own attitudes and opinions on what is sufficiently 
good health and what is harmful to it. 
Correspondingly Peter Conrad and Joseph W. Schneider (1992) make the distinction 
between positivistic and interactionist interpretations of sickness and health. They 
parallel the concept of sickness with the concept of deviance, which is reasonable in the 
context of the expansion of medicalization into new fields of human psyche, cognition 
and behavior (see also Mercer 1973, 7–8). Positivistic view of deviance understands 
deviance or sickness as something objectively real and independently existing. Maybe a 
little surprisingly, there is also room for social norms in the positivistic view. However, 
they are also thought as something quite clear and unequivocal: something which 
everyone at large recognizes and accepts. Deviance is differing notably from these known 
and respected common norms. Positivistic views focus on examining, why someone 
would differ from these norms and how could we stop this deviant behavior. Thus, it is 
about finding the objective reasons for deviance. (Conrad & Schneider 1992, 1–2.) 
In the interactionist view, in turn, social norms are context dependent. The dominant 
norms depend on the time and place and social settings. Therefore, social norms are a 
structure that we ourselves build to fit to a specific social context. Normal or healthy 
behavior is such behavior that takes place inside the boundaries of typical norms in a 
specific context. Deviance, for one, is something that in that context has been defined as 




definitions, are typically those who have a high social status and hold the dominance in 
that particular context. Thus, in the context of medicalization these people are the experts 
of medical sciences (Ibid., 2–3; Mercer 1973, 15). According to the interactionist view 
then, both the social context and the dominant set of norms are social constructs. 
Therefore, it is more reasonable to examine how and why these definitions are created and 
by who. (Conrad & Schneider 1992, 2–3.) In many ways, this view is close to and 
compatible with the social constructionist models of deviance.  
 
6.1. THE GOOD AND THE BAD OF MEDICALIZATION 
Those who criticize medicalization most often take the stance of interactionist, normative 
and social constructivist views of normality and deviance or health and sickness. Those 
defending the propagation of medicalization, in turn, often support the naturalistic and 
positivistic views. Before next turning into examining the positive and negative 
consequences of medicalization, I have first collected the different definitions of 
normality (and health) and the abovementioned stances toward medicalization into the 




















= Usual, typical, mean, most 
common 
 
Mathematical, statistic: clear, 




















= Functioning, executes the 
task it is meant for, is of the 
























= Mentally, psychologically 
normal; behaves, thinks and 
feels in an understandable 
way, can execute mental and 
cognitive tasks as others; 
behaves in an understandable 
manner  
 
Arbitrary, social construct, 
changing 
 
Hard to measure, needs 






















= Fulfills social and cultural 
expectations, follows the 
society’s norms, behaves in a 
desirable manner, agrees, 
submits  
Arbitrary, social and cultural 
construct, abstract, changing 
 





and tolerate. Adapt 






The protagonists of the medicalization movement argue that medicine is a scientific, 
efficient and humane way to treat and solve the human problems of deviance and illness. 
This is a worthy defense, as we can quickly come up with multiple examples of medical 
and humane developments advancing hand in hand.  
For example, this is the case with alcoholism: 
 Before, even as late as the beginning of the 20th century, alcoholism was 
regarded almost as a sin. At the very least it was a sign of lacking moral 
backbone. So, it was thought, that the flaw is in the alcoholic person 
themselves. They must have been somehow evil, or at least faulty as a 
human being. The usual reaction was public condemnation and sometimes 
the drunk would even get punished by arrestment. Nowadays instead, 
alcoholism is seen as a psychophysical illness, not a moral deficit. Many 
physical and genetic risk factors have been identified. The forms of 
treatment are often rehabilitative medical interventions and therapy. Thus, 
the solution now is therapeutic, not punitive. (Conrad & Schneider 1992, 
246.) 
 
The medical stance is primarily seen as scientific, and so, also as an objective view. This 
in turn, is thought to make the approach more humane, and to erase and prevent social 
stigma. (Ibid., 35, 246.) For example, an over active child is no longer seen as mean or 
wicked, or intentionally difficult, but instead she has an illness, ADHD, which explains 
the way she behaves. This is thought to reduce condemnation and discrimination. (Ibid., 
247.) Instead, of the stigma, medicalization assigns the so called sick role for deviant 




properties and behaviors are seen as illnesses or consequences of some illnesses, the 
people assigned the sick role, are freed from responsibility regarding that property or 
behavior: Because it is an illness, it is not their fault. Therefore, medicalization can lift 
the stigma, responsibility and quilt. (Ibid., 246–247.) 
Furthermore, instead of shame and punishment, medical interventions can be seen as 
positive future perspectives for the treated individual – now called “the patient”. The 
ethos of therapeutic treatment brings hope of better times, when the ideal state of 
normality can be achieved again. At its best, optimism and hope can turn into self-
fulfilling prophecies, through which the patient really is ultimately cured. (Ibid., 246–
247.) Also, medical interventions are actually often very simple and quite efficient, too. 
Medical interventions are far more quick and cheap to give out to people, than for 
example, legal judgement, let alone prison sentences. For example, medicating heroin 
addiction with methadone treatment is far more cost-efficient, than putting these people 
in jail. (Ibid., 248.) 
With all this said, it is clear, that the consequences of medicalization are not all positive. 
By this, I do not only mean, that some medical interventions can be painful in themselves, 
or that there can be negative side effects, but instead, that there are also larger, more 
abstract social and political consequences. Conrad and Schneider (1992) have listed 
different negative consequences in their book called Deviance and Medicalization: from 
Badness to Sickness. I will examine these negative consequences next. 
Firstly, Conrad and Schneider mention the shift of responsibility away from the 
individual. By this they mean, that when the sick role is assigned to somebody, their 
responsibility over their own behavior and situation diminishes considerably. On one 




their autonomy. If the person does not have full control or charge over their own situation, 
they cannot be fully accountable, and so, are not plenipotentiary (suom. täysivaltainen) 
agents over their illness. (Conrad & Schneider 1992, 248–249.)  
Autonomy can be defined in many different ways, but at its simplest, it means the agents 
power to make his or her own decisions. An autonomous person can choose their own 
goals and priorities, based on their personal values and opinions, although they may need 
help in reaching those goals. (Oshana 1998, 82; Beauchamp & Childress 2001, 58; Launis 
2007, 47.) Many times, medical patients do not have this level of autonomy, and actually 
the doctors prioritize and set goals for the patient (Launis 2007, 49). Of course, this is all 
done in the best interest of the patient, but it can, nevertheless, be problematic, as in 
almost all codes and manuals in biomedical ethics, the doctors are required to respect the 
autonomy of the patient and their right to self-determination. (see Beauchamp & 
Childress 2001; ten Have & Gordijn 2014; O’Neill 2002; Wright 1987). Also, it has to be 
noted that even persons with diminished autonomy can act autonomously in certain 
situations and their autonomy has to be respected just the same. Autonomy is not a 
categorical property, but rather a continuum. An autonomous person can also make non-
autonomous choices and a non-autonomous person can make some decisions perfectly 
well on their own. Thus, autonomy depends on the type of the decision and the decision-
making situation. (ten Have & Gordjin 2014, 58–59, 70–71.) I will return to the questions 
of autonomy in chapter 8 on the compatibility of medicalization and inclusion 
frameworks.  
Next three consequences mentioned by Conrad and Schneider relate to the status of 
medical sciences in the western society. First of them is the alleged moral neutrality of 
medicine. The medical sciences claim to handle some highly value-laden concepts of 




health. However, Conrad and Schneider argue, that these concepts are not value-neutral, 
but instead are highly normative in themselves: Health is something desirable, whereas 
sickness is a bad, unwanted state. (Conrad & Schneider 1992, 249; Launis 2007, 24.) 
Secondly, Conrad and Schneider argue, that medicalization leads to the supremacy of the 
medical professionals in our society. What is meant by this, is that, when something 
becomes medicalized, that phenomenon shifts from the public discussion into the 
scientific one, and more precisely, into the medical discussions. Consequently, the 
layperson is not able to form a worthy opinion or make judgements or decisions on the 
matter on their own, although some of these phenomena may well have been very 
mundane before. (Ibid., 249; Mercer 1973, 15; Zola 1966, 629.)  
To take an example, in many popular discussions, this has been the case with the 
diagnosis of ADHD: 
A century ago no-one was diagnosed with ADHD or medicated 
accordingly. Such diagnosis, ergo, such illness, did not even exist back then, 
nor did the corresponding medication. Yet the human brain has not changed 
notably since the Pleistocene. Hyperactive, lively individuals with problems 
of concentration and attention deficits have probably always existed. A few 
decades ago these individuals were thought of and treated as misbehaving, 
unruly kids. Often, they themselves and their parents were blamed for the 
unwanted behavior, and punishments and social condemnation could be 
severe. Teachers and parents, the extended family and even the whole 
village would discuss, how to get those unruly individuals under control. 
Even earlier in the Pleistocene, or perhaps nowadays in some hunter-
gatherer societies, the characteristics of ADHD may even have been 




may be ideal to have the tendency to shift your attention quickly, according 
to the smallest new stimulus or other change in the environment, or to be 
able to get excited, interested or worried about certain fixed, small things.4 
 
Fourth of the negative consequences mentioned by Conrad and Schneider is the intrusive 
way and massive amount of social control performed through medicalization. Through 
medicalization, such properties and forms of deviance, that were not seen as medical 
problems before, can now be subjected to major medical interventions in the name of 
therapeutic ethos of medical treatment. For example, hyperactivity can be treated with 
medication from a very young age, when the medication may interfere with the rest of 
the child’s development. Or depression can, in some severe cases, be treated by 
electroconvulsive therapy (suom. sähköshokkihoito). According to a famous critic of 
medicalization, Irving Zola (1971, 490), such treatment methods can sometimes feel, if 
not quite torture, but at least as some kind of a punishment. Conrad and Schneider (1992) 
even go so far as to argue, that sometimes the discovery of some new efficient medication 
generates the need to develop a diagnosis of a condition to fit new pharmacological 
developments. 5 
																																																						
4 I am not saying that diagnosing and treating individuals with ADHD is wrong or 
unwarranted, or that many modern interventions have not helped these individuals and 
their families to cope with their ordinary day-to-day life. On the contrary, I acknowledge 
that it could well be the opposite way around. Rather, I am pointing out that the spectrum 
of conditions now diagnosed as ADHD, have not always been seen as illnesses, and these 
conditions have been more freely present in the layman discussions and decision making 
earlier.  
5 I need to explicate, that I do not want to deny the existence of different mental disorders 
or underestimate the effects they have on the patients and their families. Rather I am 
explaining the possibly negative effects of medicalization by Conrad & Schneider, and 
want to note that in some cases medicalization and medical treatment can be better 




In western countries, our society has individualized significantly: individual trends, 
lifestyles and choices are emphasized. This development goes well together with the ethos 
of medicalization. In the medical framework, the problem is localized in the individual. 
Although blame, or even responsibility, is not placed on the individual, the diagnosis and 
the treatments are always focused on the individual patient. In a way this is quite sensible, 
as only an organism can really be physically and clinically sick (Mercer 1973, 7). The 
sayings about a “sick” society or a family unit etc. are only figurative. However, there is 
a grain of truth in those sayings: localizing the problem in the individual, ignores the 
possible effects and consequences of the individual’s social (and other) environment. This 
view ignores the possibility, that the problems in the society are actually causing the 
person to suffer and show symptoms of adverse deviance. This way social problems come 
to be seen as individual illnesses. Thus, by treating the individual, we only treat the 
symptoms, while the source of the problem is somewhere else. (Conrad & Schneider 
1992, 250.) In my opinion, this is one of the most significant points, when we examine 
the compatibility of medicalization and inclusion later on. How can we genuinely and 
fully include the person into our society, if at the same time, we dump the problems of 
the society on the individual, then expecting them to get rid of the symptoms those 
problems cause? We will get back to these thoughts later in the last chapters of this thesis. 
Medicalization and the individualization of our culture are related to the de-politicization 
(suom. epäpolitisoituminen) of human problems. When we cannot see these problems as 
social problems, we cannot deal with them through politics, although these problems may 
come from the social and political structures and socioeconomic circumstances. (Conrad 
& Schneider 1992, 251.) Some such problems can be the so called functional alcoholics 
at work places, depressed marginalized youth or overanxious housewives. With these 




again. Instead, the question is: What is the normal amount of pressure, loneliness, fear 
and hopelessness, that the person should be able to take, without developing some kind 
of deviant condition? In other words, how much is it normal to suffer in silence before 
something brakes through the surface? And what could we, as a society, do to prevent or 
ease that suffering, before it causes additional problems for the individual? With many 
modern-day social structures, norms, responsibilities and expectations, it actually feels 
quite understandable or even normal, at least in the statistical sense, if someone loses the 
control from time to time. It seems to be quite usual. For example, the three conditions 
mentioned above are not isolated incidents. On the contrary, they are quite common and 
typical demographics to stereotypically suffer those illnesses or deviances – or should I 
say symptoms. Maybe this should tell us something; The individualistic (medical) 
treatment of certain human problems might not be enough. Rather, it is just a quick fix 
for the most adverse symptoms these people are showing. Meanwhile many more will get 
ill or show symptoms the same way, if the harmful structures of the society are not 
changed. With the de-politicization of deviance, it is harder to intervene with these issues 
deep down. 
Interestingly, Conrad and Schneider (1992) lastly argue, that one of the negative 
consequences of medicalization is the disappearance of evil. Indeed, to them, this is a bad 
thing. By the disappearance or exclusion of evil, Conrad and Schneider mean, that when 
all the problematic and adverse sides of human existence and action are redefined as 
illnesses, there is no longer room for evil in the spectrum of human behavior. Through 
medicalization the term illness, and more often particularly mental illness, has become 
the term used to describe people’s inhumane actions against each other. Now we say that 
bad, evil people are sick, when we actually mean that the unspeakably horrible things 




to torture innocent animals or babies. In these cases, the word “sick” is almost 
synonymous with the word evil.  
Furthermore, this also yet again diminishes the blame and responsibility, and maybe even 
makes the actions more understandable. Of course, they are still not acceptable by any 
means, but being a product of a diseased mind explains or excuses some amount of the 
behavior. Else, these acts are so unbearable, that they are hard for us to even comprehend.  
But whether we can understand it or not, history shows us, that evilness is very much a 
possibility for any of us as human beings. The exclusion of that possibility is to twist the 
truth and to dwarf the spectrum of human action, and in doing so, we lose something from 
the multitude of human behavior. (Ibid., 251–252.) 
In addition to these listed above, I want to mention one more problematic side of 
medicalization, although it is not necessary a consequence in the same sense as the ones 
mentioned earlier. Just like the concept of normality, medicalization also faces the 
demarcation problem. As the medical sciences advance to new fields, problems of 
demarcation include questions about which human problems, qualities and phenomena 
are seen as medical problems, on what basis, and where to draw the line on sickness and 
health regarding these phenomena, that have only recently come to be treated medically. 
According to Zola (1972, 498), it is theoretically possible to label almost any condition, 
that has at least the slightest impact on bodily functions, as an illness. Now, the 
demarcation problem arises, as almost everything we do and experience in life effects our 
physiology and the function of our biological body at least in some way. Mercer calls this 
the biology bias. (Mercer 1973, 10–11.) Furthermore, because many minor ailments are 
so common, virtually everyone has at least some symptoms almost all the time, be they 
just minor lower back pain, head ache, tinnitus, fatigue or bad breath. Now, if physical 




1966, 616–617.) Combining these two biased notions, we could, in theory, say, that 
everything we experience (that we interpret to be negative) is an illness. So, the question 
is, where to draw the line of the effects, that are significant enough. And how about the 
line between good, neutral and bad effects on the body? Who is to determine where these 
lines are drawn and why? 
Zola (1972) points out, that part of the problem is that the power to make these decisions 
is in the hands of one specific profession – that is, of course, the medical profession. 
Medicalization is coupled with the notion of objectivity, but in reality, the medical 
professionals may make these decisions and demarcations based more on their own 
personal prejudices and values, than on the scientific procedure and evidence. What is 
more, even these scientific procedures and protocols can be normatively charged and 
value-laden. (Zola 1972, 498; Mercer 1973, 15, 34)  
The concepts of sickness and health are challenging to define. Health, for example, can 
be seen as the absence of sickness or, on the other hand, it can be seen as an optimal 
functioning or wellbeing. Sickness, in turn, can be defined as a bodily malfunction. 
However, it is actually never the case that an organism is completely and utterly healthy 
or completely and utterly sick.6 No one functions absolutely optimally all the time, nor 
does anyone have sickness all over their body and mind. Instead, we always seem to linger 
on the interface, on the grey area, so to say. It is human to have imperfect and fluctuating 
wellbeing. The demarcation becomes especially tricky with the definitions of mental 
health and psychological wellbeing. (Boorse 1977, 542–543, 569–571; Tulloch 2005, 
																																																						
6 Note, that this is a different notion than the categorical nature of some pathological 
conditions discussed earlier. For example, an HIV-virus is still a categorical on/off-
condition. What I mean here is, that not having HIV does not mean, that you are 
completely healthy. You may still have some other, less or more perilous ailment. Also, 




320–322.)   
Let’s take an example of anxiousness: 
It is perfectly normal to be somewhat anxious in certain situations and about 
certain things. It is normal to be anxious before a job interview or before 
meeting the future in-laws for the first time. It is normal to have anxious 
feelings and thoughts about climate change. It is normal to feel anxious in 
a car crash or straight after it, but at some point, after some time, it just has 
to stop. There are also physical phenomena on the background of these 
mechanisms of anxiousness. They even serve a purpose, they can be 
adaptive. Some people get more anxious more easily than others. Some 
people cannot do certain things because their anxiousness will not let them: 
Some do not want to drive a car, some cannot go to a rollercoaster or on a 
plane, some cannot eat broccoli. Some people even subjectively suffer from 
their anxiousness. Of course, we want to help at least the people who suffer 
for their level of anxiety. But at what point does the amount of anxiousness 
become pathological and demanding of treatment and on what basis? No 
one wants to deny the help from the suffering, but the valid definition of the 
boundaries of sickness and health cannot be subjective experiences alone. 
When, how and why does anxiousness become an illness in some 
situations?7 
																																																						
7	Note, that the demarcation problem also seems to be somewhat in contrast with the 
biophysical definitions of health and normality, where many phenomena are categorical. 
Perhaps it is for this, that some have come to think that these categorical health-related 
phenomena are the “real” illnesses, and other, more arbitrary and ill-defined illnesses 





The same problems of definition, which we looked at in previous chapters, seem to lie in 
the foundations of the demarcation problem here as well. For example, it is clear that 
health and wellbeing are good and desirable things. Still we cannot define everything that 
is somehow non-optimal as deviance or sickness. In doing so we would get a way too 
broad definitions of sickness and deviance.  Launis & Räikkä 1995, 83.) For example, 
deviating from optimal body mass index (BMI) is not yet sickness, although it may 
challenge optimal wellbeing. Or think about mental and cognitive capacities; For 
instance, what would be the optimal set of arithmetic skills or speech recognition? How 
would they be defined and why, and how many people could actually achieve them? On 
the other hand, health is not just the absence of sickness or deviance, either. Otherwise 
we would probably never be healthy, as we almost always have some minor fungal 
infection, acid reflux, gum disease, caries, acne or whatever small inconveniences. So, it 
seems that we would need additional conditions to these definitions, but there is no 
consensus on what these conditions could be, as different viewpoints on health and 
normality (ergo normative vs. interactionist, statistical vs. social constructivist etc.) 
dictate these opinions.  
Often it is suggested as an additional condition for the definition of sickness, that diseases 
are such conditions, which are 1) harmful for wellbeing and 2) treated by medical 
professionals. Thus, the concept of sickness would be defined through the ethos of 
therapeutic treatment. Ironically, this viewpoint summarizes the demarcation problem 
perfectly. The boundaries of medical theories, treatments and practices, and the 
boundaries of medical institutions change over time, and thus, also influence our views 
on what is healthy or sick and in need of treatment and cure. (Boorse 1977, 545.) This 






pregnancy, delivery and menopause, for example. These conditions have come to be 
medicalized, because in the modern Western societies we know how to intervene 
medically, should something abnormal happen. (Zola 1966, 617–618.) Defining sickness 
through the possibility or demand for treatment, begs the question at best, and quite 
possibly leads to a vicious circle, at worst. On the other hand, with the demarcation 
problem, it is sensible to take the practical viewpoint into consideration as well. If we see, 
that the goal of the medical profession is to maintain and promote health and wellbeing, 
this task becomes quite hard, if we do not even agree on the boundaries of the goal 
condition. (Tulloch 2005, 321–323.) 
Because of the demarcation problem and because medicalization advances on the fields 
of human psychology and behavior, many such properties that earlier were just regarded 
as different personality traits, individual ways of reacting or uncommon habits, now 
become seen and treated as illnesses. How far can we take this advancement and is there 
anything “normal” left after that? Will we at some point, or even already, medicate some 
personality traits, moods or feeling, like Zola suggested in the 70s? (1972, 495.) Also, 
with the high social status and the mechanism of social control, medicine often comes to 
our lives before any major, treatable illness even exists. These are called the pre-emptive 
measures (suom. ennaltaehkäisy), and they take place, for example, during pregnancy 
and child delivery, or if a person is part of a health risk group etc. (Launis & Räikkä 1995, 
87; Zola 1972, 493–494.) 
Thus far I have analyzed the concepts of normality and deviance as its reverse side, and 
in this chapter also the paradigm of medicalization and its consequences. Simultaneously 
with medicalization, another social framework, inclusion, is also prominent. Inclusion 
can be seen as a counter force to segregation, marginalization and institutionalization. 




inclusion go together hand in hand. In the earlier social paradigms, deviance has been 
seen as a sin or criminal disposition. It is only logical that the reaction has thus been to 
segregate and punish these people. Through medicalization, however, it has become more 
feasible to accept and accommodate the deviant individuals to the main-stream society. 
On the other hand, the situation is also more complex and even problematic. It could be 
argued, that the tactics of medicalization mainly (or only) enable the physical inclusion 
of deviant people in to the same concrete spaces with the so called normal people. To see 
this polymorphous relationship between these two paradigms, we now first turn to the 
concept analysis of the notion of inclusion. 
 
7. INCLUSION 
In the crudest sense, inclusion can be understood as taking along, going along and 
belonging together. We can talk about inclusion on many different levels of society and 
concerning different kinds of institutions. We can talk about the inclusiveness of the 
society as a whole, the inclusiveness of some institution as a whole (like a school, for 
example), or of some smaller part of that institution, or as a property of some physical 
space, construction or building, meant for social use (like the school building). In this 
thesis, my analysis concentrates mainly on the first two levels mentioned. I analyze 
inclusion as a societal phenomenon, but through concrete examples and thought 
experiments I try to tie the concept more closely to the school environment. Moreover, it 
must be noted, that these different levels and layers of inclusion are interconnected and 
influence each other. For example, working toward more inclusive schools and 
educational systems, will also, in the long run, improve the inclusiveness of the society 
and the societal ethos in its entirety. (Biklen 2001, 55–61; Lipsky & Gartner 1996, 788; 




As I may have already insinuated, inclusion can be understood, not only on different 
levels, but also as taking different dimensions or scopes. It can be defined both extremely 
theoretically or in a very hands-on manner. In the narrowest sense, inclusion can be 
understood simply as a physical proximity of different kinds of people. Practically this 
means the desegregation and deinstitutionalization of deviant people. In the school 
context, for example, this means that all kinds of different pupils will sit together in the 
same classroom, regardless of their special needs, individual strengths and talents, 
possible disorders or handicaps. Thus, instead of segregating into special schools or 
classrooms, the disabled and the deviant will also attend the same schools, and basically 
the same classes, as the so called normal pupils do, in the so called ordinary schools and 
classrooms. This is often also called integration. Many times, inclusion in school context 
is also described with the term of “least restrictive environment”, ergo LRI. This means 
that every pupil has the right to attend a normal class and not be excluded from the 
ordinary classroom unless absolutely necessary. (Crockett & Kauffman 2001.) 
Then again, in the broadest sense, inclusion can be seen as an all-encompassing 
philosophy of life. According to Dorothy Lipsky and Alan Gartner (1996) inclusion is not 
a question about space and location, it is a question about the redistribution of power. 
Inclusion can be seen as a comprehensive anti-discrimination, anti-marginalization and 
all-accepting ideal – much like the ideal of ahimsa, for example.8 In this broad sense, 
inclusion is seen as a social ideal or theory, which advocates equal participation and 
involvement of everyone in our common society. At least on the surface, this seems to be 
																																																						
8 Ahimsa is a philosophical ideal of pacifism and anti-violence, most famously 
advocated by Mahatma Gandhi or the Buddhist religion, especially Jainism. The ideal 
can be summarized as a single statement: “Do no harm”. In the broader sense, it also 
advices us to be benevolent and accepting toward all kinds of living beings, from plants 





well compatible with the other social values and ideals of free, egalitarian and democratic 
western societies, with the famous motto of the French revolution “freedom, brotherhood 
and equality” still very much alive. The basis of this broad interpretation of inclusion is 
the notion that difference is a riches, an asset, and something to be cherished, coupled 
with the idea, that equality is the key to prosperity and well-being. (Biklen 2001, 55–59; 
Saloviita 1999, 13; Väyrynen 2001, 12–21.) 
Undoubtedly this is a noble idea. Hardly anyone (at least in modern western cultures) will 
directly resist these beautiful principles. Unfortunately, however, such sublime wording 
provides very little practical advise on how to realize these great ideals in the real world. 
Maybe it is partly for this lack of concrete advise, that the applications of inclusion have 
so many times only concerned the physical closeness and accessibility, thus falling short 
of the deeper meanings of inclusion. Unfortunately, the physical proximity alone can 
hardly ever promote genuine connections and meaningful interaction between profoundly 
different people. Thus, it seems, that if we want to pursue inclusion, as is aligned in the 
UN general assembly of 1993 and the Salamanca declaration (1994), we need a more 
commonly understandable and more easily applicable, but also, at the same time, more 
wholesome and deeper notion of inclusion, instead of these two above examined 
extremities. 
Actually, this is exactly what the modern inclusion discourses have aspired for in the 
recent years. More fruitful and applicable definitions of inclusion have been developed 
through a process-like description of inclusion. According to these descriptions inclusion 
is not something that just happens or takes place easily, spontaneously and once and for 
all. Instead, it is a process of social change, that is always in motion, as long as extensive 
societal efforts are made together towards the common goal of more and more inclusive 




pressure to change lifts from the shoulders of the deviant individual, and becomes the 
burden of the society and its institutions to become suitable environments to all kinds of 
people. (Thompson 2012, 65; Lipsky & Gartner 1999, 99–100; Väyrynen 2001, 16–19.)  
According to Lipsky & Gartner (1996) inclusion is the combination of integration and 
individual approaches to support justice, fairness and equality. The relationship between 
inclusion and the individual is more complex than the patient-professional-relationship 
of medicalization. Inclusion sees both the individual skills, strengths, needs and 
impairments as well as the social surroundings of the individual. We are moving from the 
medical model towards a more inclusive society when we start to talk about needs instead 
of disorders or disabilities (Graham-Matheson 2012, 8–11). In the Finnish school system, 
this notion has been internalized as the model of special support in schools (suom. 
erityisen tuen malli). The decisions over special support are always done individually and 
based on the special assistance needs. Decisions must also be re-evaluated as the needs 
may change. (Opetushallitus 2016.) Furthermore, everyone has needs and the different 
needs can be divided into individual, special and general needs. When we talk about needs 
instead of disorders, we can understand the environmental factors more easily – and 
especially the non-physical social factors as well. The discourse should eventually move 
further from needs, to rights and the equality of possibilities. This guarantees that the 
inclusion does not stop at the level of mere integration, and that it does not concentrate 
on unidirectional adaptation of the pupil to her physical and social environment, but also, 
and even primarily, the adaptation of the environmental structures to enable the equal 
rights and possibilities for different learners. (Graham-Matheson 2012, 13–15.) 
At the same time, this means that the discussion no longer concerns only some small, 
marginal group of deviant people, but it actually concerns all of us just the same. Now, 




as the school and classroom environment, more flexible, so that it will be a reasonable 
and pleasant environment for every pupil, be their individual challenges and strengths 
whatever they may be. In this sense, the pupil as an individual and the school as an 
institution are in a process-like interaction, which ultimately strives to remove the 
obstacles in the way of the full participation of the individual, and does this primarily by 
changing the environment, not the individual. (Ekins 2012; Väyrynen 2001, 16–19.) 
Described this way, inclusion is much easier to implement, assess, and develop further. 
Examples concerning the school world are many: We can use different and diverse 
teaching methods and pedagogies, build more accessible spaces and truly inclusive 
settings, like nurture group areas (see for example Middlemas 2012, 78–84) introduce 
different aids and tools, engage personal assistants and use different evaluation methods 
etc. Many times, the more diverse and flexible methods are actually the best ones for all 
students, even for the so called “normal” (healthy/neurotypical/without learning 
difficulties) learners (Lipksy & Gartner 1996, 767; Staub & Peck 1994, 36–39 cited in 
Lipsky & Gartner 1996, 786–787). 
 
7.1. THE GOOD AND THE BAD OF INCLUSION 
When it comes to the practical implementation of the ideas of inclusion it can be hugely 
advantageous to see inclusion as a dynamic social process. However, there are at least 
two main problems or worries about this position. Firstly, we have to keep in mind, that 
the experience of belonging, just as well as the experience of being marginalized, is a 
subjective experience. Although we can maybe improve the chances of feeling included, 
participation and being along is something everyone does and feels personally and 
subjectively. (Väyrynen 2001, 20; Biklen 2001, 61–77.) It has also been pointed out that 




the right to these positive social feelings and experiences is equal for everyone (Lipsky 
& Gartner 1996; Salamanca statement 1994). Therefore, as every person is an individual 
with their own wants and needs, strengths and shortcomings, the ways of accommodating 
everyone’s needs have to be extremely diverse. Guaranteeing equal chances for everyone, 
does not mean the same or similar treatment for everyone. On the contrary, many times 
it means diverse and different approaches to treat people according to their needs. Thus, 
approaches of an inclusive society or an inclusive school must be creative and flexible. 
For example, in the school world we want to tailor the curriculums more and more 
individually to suit the specific skill profile of every individual pupil. (Väyrynen 2001, 
21–26; Rawls 2001.) 
The need for diverse and different methods generates the second worry related to the 
resources for successful implementation of inclusion. To treat everyone, not only 
similarly and evenly, but justly and equally, we need to implement diverse methods, tools 
and aids etc. The diversity of tools means, that we need more resources, than in the 
ordinary homogenous classroom. In the ordinary classroom, it is usually the case, that 
one teacher teaches maybe 20 children in the same way at the same time, while they sit 
in the same room in their similar desks looking at their similar books. However, everyone 
does not learn the same things the same way, rate or time. Now, for this, we want to bring 
in more diverse teaching methods, tools and aids, different curriculums, new ways of 
evaluating, maybe even bring new personnel to the room, and preferably also less pupils 
per classroom. All these changes are said to require more resources. Partly for this, the 
attitudes towards inclusion amongst teachers have, in many different studies, been quite 
negative. (Moberg, 1998; 2001; Pinola 2008; Naukkarinen & Ladonlahti 2001.)  
However, quite many studies have also already been conducted on the best ways to 




the practice and application of inclusive principles in schools. It is not in the scope of this 
thesis to examine or speculate on the practices of inclusion any further. Instead, I will 
conclude this matter by noting, that many practical problems also arise from different 
interpretations on, and ways of understanding inclusion. Thus, confused, unclear and 
changing concepts and definitions of inclusion, deviance and normality clearly contribute 
to the practical problems as well. (Graham-Matheson 2012, 11). As stated earlier, the aim 
of this thesis is, in part, to clarify and open up these concepts and definitions to clear up 
the discussion, or at least to point out all the possible points of misunderstanding.  
In the following chapter, I will go further into the reflective equilibrium and the analysis 
of the compatibility of these two paradigms. The analysis begins by examining the 
similarities and differences between the two paradigms and their stances on deviance and 
normality. Note, that the similarities or differences per se do not yet state anything about 
the compatibility or incompatibility of the paradigms. 
 
8. REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM: ARE THE TWO COMPATIBLE? 
In this chapter, I apply the concept analysis’ of the conceptions of medicalization and 
inclusion, and of their respective ways of defining and reacting to normality and deviance, 
all examined earlier in this thesis. These earlier analysis’ are reflected in a holistic, 
process-like manner, to notice their similarities and differences, their compatibilities and 
incompatibilities. The aim is to spot the possible contradictions and incompatibilities and 





8.1. THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE TWO PARADIGMS: INDIVIDUAL TO 
THE FOREFRONT 
In this subchapter I argue, that there are two main similarities between the frameworks of 
medicalization and inclusion. First of these similarities is the motivation or intent behind 
the practices and the other one has to do with the target of the rationale or operations in 
both paradigms.  
Firstly, the motivational similarity between inclusion and medicalization is the endeavor 
towards more humane practices. The ideology and practices of both these paradigms are 
clearly striving towards less suffering, punishment, pain and blame compared to other 
social frameworks in the history of deviance. Both ideals claim to pursue better well-
being inclusively for everyone: Not only for the so called normal majority, but also for 
the deviant or sick individuals. This is in clear contrast with the earlier moralistic and 
punitive paradigms, where it was more important to segregate the deviant away from the 
majority, to make the ordinary people feel more at ease – although often at the cost of the 
well-being of the so called deviant people. Both medicalization and inclusion aim to help 
(not punish or condemn) the individual. 
Now we get to the second similarity: the individual, which is the target of action in both 
paradigms. Our western society is all about well-being, but it is even more about the 
individual – and so are the paradigms of inclusion and medicalization. Both paradigms 
raise the individual to the forefront of practical action and change. The ways they do it, 
however, are a bit different. Nevertheless, the aim of the actions taken is ultimately the 
same – the well-being of the individual. 
Firstly, let’s examine medicalization, where this individualization is more prevalent. 




concepts of sickness (pathology) and health. Like mentioned before, sickness seems to be 
necessarily a property of an individual. Else, the term is only figurative. Only an 
individual can be sick or ill. Sickness exists only inside the body of the individual, often 
more specifically inside a certain organ, structure or function of the body. For this, of 
course, also the operations and interventions of medicalization target the individual. 
Many times, they even target more specific diseased body parts, or even distinct 
symptoms of the disease or malfunction. Like already became clear earlier, Conrad and 
Schneider (1992) have criticized medicalization for this individualistic stance, arguing 
that it makes it impossible to address social and socially generated problems, for which 
the individual is only showing some adverse symptoms. 9 
Although medicalization does not blame the individual, it also takes more theoretical 
attitudes toward the individual. Instead of blame, the individual is assigned the sick role 
– a part to play. According to medicalization, we do not want to label or stigmatize the 
individual, but we want to diagnose them. All done, of course, in the best interest of the 
individual. And so, the individual becomes the patient. The sick role obligates the patient 
to want, seek and receive medical help and treatment, but it also diminishes their 
responsibility and the level of their autonomy, at least in regards of their illness. However, 
this decrease in autonomy is not seen as a problem, precisely because of the role, the part 
																																																						
9 Note, that these symptoms do not need to be only psychological or psychosocial 
abnormalities – they can be physical, too. For example, hypertension can, to an extent, 
be seen as a social and societal problem. It is often said to be a lifestyle illness. In the 
modern western societies, basically all of us have enough wealth to smoke tobacco, 
drink too much alcohol, eat too much meat and other greasy, sugary, unhealthy foods. 
At the same time, we live fast-based, competition and success orientated, yet 
comparably lonely lives, with demanding and stressful work lives and long working-
hours often in sedentary office environments. These are all social, societal, cultural and	
environmental factors making many of us ill in the first place. Medical treatments only 
focus on the physical consequences, and so, only serve as temporary solutions for larger 
scale problems. These problems also impact, not only distinct individuals, but also the 





of the patient. Through the sick role and through being the patient – ergo the object of 
medical operations – the individual will still be heard and taken into account. (Zola 
1973.)10  
Now, let’s turn to the individualism of inclusion. Although especially the process-like 
description of inclusion locates the pressure to change heavily on the society and 
environmental factors, it is still primarily the individual’s benefit we are looking out for. 
We want to make the social and concrete structures better-fitted for all, but we also want 
to diversify and tailor curriculums to be better suited for every pupil’s personal and 
individual needs and skills. Also, the ideal to regard differences as riches and as a starting 
point is apt to feed the individualistic trend. Helen Turnbull (2016) has argued, that true 
inclusion is getting to know everyone’s individual story and the continuous aspiration 
towards understanding different individuals. In a way, it could even be argued, that 
inclusion in itself might be a natural developmental step of the overall individualization 
and empowerment processes of the western societies. However, inclusion, at the exact 
same time also emphasizes the accountability of the society and social structures as well. 
In case they were in contrast with the individual’s rights and needs, it is the obligation of 
those structures to change to accommodate the individual.   
Inclusion also raises the individual to the forefront of the discussion by emphasizing equal 
rights of participation, involvement and the empowerment of deviant individuals. By 
empowering marginalized people, encouraging genuine belonging and supporting 
participation into society, inclusion comes to endorse autonomy. Like already described 
earlier, autonomy is the ability to rightly make one’s own decisions and so, to take both 
the responsibility and credit for them. Autonomous action requires freedom, 
																																																						
10 See	Havi Carel (2008) about the subjective experiences of the sick role and the 




intentionality and understanding. Freedom here means voluntariness, or coming from 
one’s self, ergo, freedom from coercion, manipulation or blackmail. (Lindley 1986, 5–6.) 
Intentionality means deliberateness and willful action, as opposed to accidents, reflexes 
or coincidences. Understanding is a more complex matter. It means that the agent has 
enough relevant information to make well-based decisions. (Beauchamp & Childress 
2001, 58–59, 88–89). But what does it mean to have enough information, what things are 
relevant enough to take into consideration, and which are good enough reasons for some 
decision over another?  
Theoretically there are basically two ways, how autonomy can be endorsed. When 
actively supporting autonomy, we concentrate on ensuring that the abovementioned 
requirements are fulfilled. This can be done, for example, by giving full exposure on the 
relevant facts or even physically aiding the person do the deed they have decided on. 
When passively supporting autonomy, we only concentrate on refraining from practices 
that directly obstruct or violate one’s autonomy. This is done, for example, by refraining 
from coercion, manipulation or leading use of language. It can also be understood as 
minimizing the factors threatening one’s autonomy – for example dismantling 
marginalizing and discriminatory social structures, or building more accessible spaces. 
(Beauchamp & Childress 2001, 64.)  
To my understanding, inclusion encases both these ways of supporting autonomy. 
However, it may be harder to understand or even notice all the ways passive supporting, 
ergo dismantling certain social structures, for example, could and should be done. These 
abstract structures, cultural habits, biases and power relations also sit extremely tight in 
our society. For example, in the field of disabled studies, special education has been 
criticized for paternalism as “normal”, non-disabled, non-marginalized scientists study 




dismantling the juxtaposing or marginalization, but on the contrary, may even help to 
preserve and endorse it further. (see Vehmas 2005; Hallett & Hallett 2012) Also, people 
tend to adjust to the impact and exercise of dominance. This means that the marginalized 
people react and behave in ways that show their submission. For example, they may 
remain silent in situations where they actually would have something to say, but where 
those who represent the dominant culture are leading the discussion. (Turnbull 2016, 31.)  
This generates two questions. Firstly, have the social structures and power relations 
already ripped the marginalized for their possibility to ever have a voice, by destroying 
or diluting their abilities to participate? (Richards 2012, 26.) Secondly, does this 
submission actually facilitate the abuse of power by the dominant majority as the silence 
actually allows the perpetrator to continue to feel innocent? At least it does not help the 
dominant to realize their dominance and privilege, or even the existence of differing 
minority views. (Turnbull 2016, 31.) These problems, to me, highlight the reciprocal and 
bilateral nature of the process of inclusion, as both the majority and the minorities need 
to be participating in the discussion. 
 
8.2. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO PARADIGMS: ACCEPTANCE VS. 
TREATMENT 
In a way, we already started to see some differences with inclusion and medicalization 
concerning autonomy and the object of change in the previous chapter, although it was 
meant to highlight the similarities between the paradigms. This may be taken to say 
something about the nature of similarities and compatibilities between the two paradigms 
– namely, that they seem to be quite superficial. I will now briefly continue on the 




between the two paradigms. 
In many bioethical texts, and also in the Finnish doctoral oath, for example, some weight 
is explicitly given to the autonomy of the patient, as well (see Beauchamp & Childress 
2001; ten Have & Gjordijn 2013; Finnish Doctor’s Oath, Lääkärinvala 2013.) This may 
even be an emerging trend as discussions about the rights to abortion and euthanasia 
proceed. However, the autonomy of the patient is often mentioned in the light of the 
doctor’s ability to better evaluate and decide for the patient. In philosophy, this is called 
weak paternalism. The other way for doctors to relate to the autonomy of the patient is to 
view the patient’s autonomy as a border or limit for the doctor’s responsibility. So, the 
doctor is only responsible of the treatment, to the point that the patient does not have 
autonomy or does not exercise her autonomy. This is called the model of respecting 
autonomy. (Launis 2007, 121.)  
Actually, the doctors can also make decisions about other people’s level of autonomy. 
This is the case, for example, with the state of mind examinations (suom. 
mielentilatutkimus) and non compos mentis verdicts (suom. lausunto 
syyntakeettomuudesta). This is called the gatekeeping role (suom. portinvartijarooli) of 
the medical profession. (Beauchamp & Childress 2001, 69–70; Conrad & Schneider 
1992, 244.) The power to make these decisions can be seen as a form of social control 
and paternalism as well as a sign of prestige the medical profession has. These in turn, 
have been understood as one of the consequences of medicalization, as mentioned before. 
(Conrad & Schneider 1992, 241–250; Mercer 1973, 34.) In any case, this power over 
about someone else’s autonomy is in contrast with the inclusions aims of empowering 
people, supporting their autonomy and deconstructing paternalistic structures.  




one even more fundamental difference between the paradigms of medicalization and 
inclusion. That fundamental difference is the difference between the ethos of therapeutic 
cure and the ethos of empowering acceptance. I will argue, that this difference may be so 
profound and severe that it can lead into unreconciled contradictions between the two 
paradigms and an impasse of cure versus acceptance.  
According to medicalization human problems are to be solved through medical 
treatment. This treatment can be 1) pharmaceutical 2) other medical interventions (like 
surgery) 3) therapy (physical and/or psychological) 4) any combination of some or all of 
these. The aim of this treatment is to A) promote health, B) intervene with illnesses, C) 
cure sickness and D) ease suffering (Lääkärinvala 2013.) As we saw earlier, 
medicalization uses the concepts of healthy and normal as well as deviant (abnormal) and 
sick synonymously. This is also the case with mental illnesses. Like we also saw earlier, 
medicalization relies strongly on the statistical and biophysical conceptions of 
medicalization. (Mercer 1973, 2–11; Launis 2007, 117.) According to these conceptions 
coupled with the naturalistic and positivistic views, sickness/deviance and 
health/normality are real, independently existing states of affairs. However, there is also 
a hidden normative connotation on the concepts of health/normality and 
sickness/deviance in the framework of medicalization. Implicitly, it is clear that health is 
something desirable or good, whereas sickness is inherently bad and undesirable. Ergo, 
normality is desirable, deviance is bad. Hence the ethos of therapeutic cure. 
Let’s see this notion in the form of a non-formal argument: 
1) Medicalization uses the terms healthy and normal as well as deviant and sick 
synonymously.  





3) Bio functional conceptions of normality have implicit normative connotation and 
medicalization also imposes them on statistical views on normality 
4) Thus, existence of health is something desirable and good, whereas the 
occurrence of sickness is something unwanted and negative.  
5) Only an individual (or a part of an individual) can be sick  
6) The aim of medicine is to cure sickness and restore health  
7) Because the term “healthy” is synonymous with “normality”, to cure is to 
return to normality. 
8) Because sickness is located in the individual, the cure is focused on the 
individual. 
9)  Thus, the aim is to return the individual to normality. 
 
According to medicalization, although deviance/sickness is bad, it is also curable. 
Through medical intervention and treatment, it is possible to restore health, and so, to 
return the individual back to normality. Actually, this is, in summary, the meaning of the 
so called therapeutic ethos of medicalization. The therapeutic ethos, in turn, is said to be 
one of the most positive sides and consequences of medicalization, bringing about, 
amongst others, the humane treatment of patients, also known as deviant individuals. The 
justification of the therapeutic ethos comes from the hidden normative meanings of 
normality/health and sickness/deviance. These normative connotations are smuggled in 
the bio functional, and even the initially neutral, statistical views of normality and 
deviance. 
The conclusion is a straight result from 1) the synonymous and vague use of the concepts 




positivistic views, 3) normative connotation on deviance/sickness and normality/health 
and 4) the therapeutic ethos or the desirability of treatment and cure. Note, that this is a 
logically valid argument. It means that the conclusions logically follow from the 
premises. The conclusion (number 10) and intermediate conclusions are marked with 
bold letters. The argument represents a form of modus ponens, the so called “if x then y” 
-reasoning. When an argument is logically valid, it means that it is inherently coherent 
and correct. (Sober 2013, 13–15.) Note that we can still oppose or disagree with the 
argument and its conclusion. To oppose or disagree with the conclusion, we need to 
abandon or refute at least one of the premises. When an argument is logically valid, we 
cannot hold and accept the premises, while denying the conclusion, because the 
conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. However, if we abandon any or all the 
premises, we can also abandon the conclusion,  
The argument above is also contingent. Contingent argument means, that its truth value 
is dependent on its correspondence with the outside reality. Thus, this is not an a priori, 
but an a posteriori argument. The argument only holds true as long as the premises 
correspond with the reality. (Aspenson 1998, 34; Sober 2012, 53.) For example, we could 
abandon the synonymous use of the concepts of sickness and deviance. We could also 
deny the normative connotations of sickness/deviance and health/normality. This 
however, is unlikely and implausible, as it feels intuitive to regard sickness as a bad thong 
and health as a good thing. Refuting this premise would also eat away at the foundations 
of justifying medical treatment and the ethos of the act of curing. In any case, whenever 
one of the premises of this argument does not hold true, it does not correspond with the 
reality, and thus is not a sound argument, although it is still valid. (Ibid.) 
Now us, who already know a little bit about the ideals of inclusion, may find something 




alone condemnable idea or argument in itself, but in regards of the compatibility with 
inclusion it seems to be a bit problematic. 
Like the ethos of therapeutic treatment for medicalization, acceptance and tolerance are 
the primary ethos for inclusion. Like we have seen earlier in this thesis, inclusion often 
takes a more normative and constructionist stance on normality and deviance. Ergo, we 
can not necessarily see anything normal or deviant in the reality, per se, but rather, they 
are crude categories, that the mind imposes on the multitude of human existence. When 
this categorization becomes institutionalized, it becomes a device of social control. Those 
in control have the power to determine these categories and their boundaries, regardless 
of their objectivity. It is precisely to this, that the ideal of inclusion hopes to bring a 
change. That change, in turn, is brought about, both, by actively deconstructing the 
categorization and, on the other hand, by the attitude of acceptance, tolerance and anti-
discrimination. This kind of profound tolerance means, that everyone is and can be 
different. For this, it also means that no-one has to change for the sake of others, not even 
for the sake of the vast majority. Actually, it might even be the other way around: The 
attitudes and structures of the established majority may have to change, to accommodate 
everyone’s needs and prevent marginalization.   
Now let’s see this rationale as an argument: 
1) Every individual is different. 
2) The aim of inclusion is to accept, accommodate and celebrate everyone’s different 
skills and needs. 
3) Thus, there is no need to change or erase individual differences. 
4) The dominant majority (and/or professions of prestige) hold the power to use 




5) The one-sided use of social control makes the society not accepting and not 
attainable for all different individuals. 
6) Thus, it is the society, that has to change, so that everyone may feel welcome 
and empowered.  
 
This too is a valid contingent argument. Note that especially premises 4 and 5 are highly 
empirical. If these premises do not correspond to reality then the argument is not sound. 
Also, in that case we may conclude that the task of inclusion is completed. According to 
inclusion, difference and diversity are the starting points of society and social life. They 
are also to be cherished, accommodated and accepted. Sometimes with medicalization it 
seems to be the other way around: Normality is the starting point, the point of deviation. 
Deviant individuals are to be medicated in order to make them normal again. 
Medicalization wants to cut the bell curve from both extremes.  
The best most salient examples of this are psychological issues: 
 We want to treat both social hyperactivity and extreme shyness. There is 
something suspicious about both conditions. Mania is no more normal or 
acceptable than depression. Both are adversities of the normal scale of mood 
swings. A certain amount of aggression is said to be a good thing, but both 
extremes can be quite damaging: the excess is damaging to others and a 
total lack of it, is often bad for the person himself. Punctuality is a valuable 
trait. Yet it is pathological to be punctual to the point of compulsive 
obsession, just as is it is pathological to be totally negligent and oblivious, 
too. Normal working memory capacity is about seven digits. Yet someone 




may be quite agonizing conditions at times. 
 
Now, I am not saying that we should let people be as manic, depressed, or anxiously 
obsessed as they are or want to be. Or, that we need to tolerate extreme aggression and 
violence, for example. I am not saying, that inclusion demands that either. The point is, 
rather, that there can be other additional or alternative solutions to the problems caused 
by these extreme versions of behavior, personality traits and reaction tendencies. The 
endeavor of bringing the expression of these traits closer to the population mean often is 
not the only option, maybe not the best one either. However, I also want to explicitly note, 
that there are many medical fields and issues, where the statistical mean, the bell curve 
or the concepts of normality and deviance do not seem to matter much, if at all. There are 
some almost “purely” physical traits, functions and issues, where the physical, medical 
treatment is clearly both the best and often also the only possibility. Such are, for example, 
many, if not all, surgical issues as well as the likes of mending broken limbs or treating 
small box, HIV or ebola. However, we have to, of course, accept and empower the ones 
battling with these conditions and diseases, too. The best solution is about the right 
combination and amount of implemented measures. 
In the table on the following page I have summarized the similarities and differences of 
medicalization and inclusion. Next, I will turn to the compatibilities and incompatibilities 
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8.3. THE COMPATIBILITY AND INCOMPATIBILITY OF MEDICALIZATION 
AND INCLUSION 
In this on-going chapter, I have established some similarities as well as some major 
differences between the paradigms of medicalization and inclusion. The differences, per 
se, do not yet conclude anything about the incompatibility of these social frameworks. 
On the contrary, certain amount of differences between the two philosophies may even 
complement each other, and so, together they may make up the most fruitful and well-
fitted approach to any and all human problems. On the other hand, these differences could 
be so profound and intense, that the paradigms are in an irreconcilable disagreement. 
 
8.3.1. MEDICALIZATION AS AN ENABLER OF INCLUSION 
Many medical treatments, operations and aids are designed to help the individual function 
in their normal day-to-day life and environment. The goal is to retain action competence 
(suom. toimintakyky). For example, prosthetic legs, pacemakers and hearing aids are such 
concrete, physical, functional aids, which make it easier for people to live and act as they 
may have acted before their illness or accident, and as everybody else is typically able 
acting. Note, that also other less concrete and straight forward intervention often aim at 
this outcome. For example, anti-anxiety or ADHD medication can come a long way in 
enabling people suffering from anxiety, or living with ADHD, to behave in the same way 
as others do, and to maintain their quality of life. So, it seems, that in a sense medical 
interventions too, concentrate mainly on guaranteeing the relational abilities, discussed 
earlier in chapter 4. Instead of guaranteeing the intrinsic abilities (except maybe in 
transplant surgeries), the interventions focus more on supporting and sustaining the 
person’s competency and performance. In this way, the question is not about what 




regardless of the amount of help and support they need to succeed. 11 
Just like with the basic ethos of inclusion, it is not the primary goal of all medical practices 
to change the individual, but rather to support and enable them to function in meaningful 
and reasonable way. In this sense then, it seems, that the medical interventions make it 
possible to accomplish the sentiment of inclusion in practice. Also, it may well be the 
same sentiment, ergo, the will to include and accept everyone, that has, in the first place, 
directed the trajectory of medicine and medical treatments to help and support people’s 
competency and natural (typical) capacities. So, at least in a sense, these social paradigms 
and their development seems to be not only compatible, but they seem to go hand in hand.  
Furthermore, I think, that at least when it comes to the most narrow, physical level of 
inclusion, the medicalization paradigm is at its most compatible with the paradigm of 
inclusion. When the primary objective is just to bring the different individuals to the same 
physical space – and especially when the space is initially designed for the average, 
“normal” people – it becomes extremely important to adjust and modify the deviant 
features and skill sets to fit the ordinary environment.  
Let’s take two examples from the school context: 
1) ADHD medication:  
For a child diagnosed with ADHD it can be excruciatingly hard to try and sit 
still and silently for 45–60 minutes at a time. It can be made easier in a special 
																																																						
11 Notice, that many such interventions are really quite common and absolutely 
necessary. For example, eye glasses (and contact lenses or eye surgery) are, in a way, 
maybe the most common medical aid. They also make the users life, behavior, 
competency and quality of life totally and utterly “normal”, so to say. However, without 
them life would be quite difficult to many, and often also painful and dangerous. Many 
things, like driving a car or reading and writing, could be even impossible to some. This 
example just goes to show, that practically every single one of us will need at least some 




environment with special aids, and pedagogies and with an assistant. If, 
however, our only (or main) aim is to bring the child from these special 
settings into the “normal”, ordinary setting, something else has to be done to 
guarantee the peace to learn for every pupil in that class. In this case the 
medication can help in both calming the outward behavior, thus protecting the 
peace and quiet, and in making it easier for the child to stay concentrated.  
 
2) Prosthetic limbs and remedial surgery:  
We have a clear schema in our minds on how the human body should look 
like. We instinctively notice right away if someone is missing a leg or an eye, 
or if their hand is misshapen or malformed. And what is more, upon noticing 
we also instinctively feel quite uneasy, perhaps even disgusted in some 
extreme cases. Of course, the loss or malformation of limbs and organs also 
cause harm to the individual, as at least their intrinsic abilities to move, see or 
write, for example, can be endangered. By building and installing a realistic 
prosthesis to a stump or an empty eye socket, or by reconstructing a nose, for 
example, we can easily make the person look and appear quite “normal”, so 
to say. This can make it less likely for other pupils to stare and point, or maybe 
even notice the abnormality at all. This, in turn, can also be easier for the 
child’s self-esteem and for an integrated self-image, as well. 
What is more, these normalizing, relational skill enhancing operations and treatments 
often make it psychologically easier both for the deviant people to come to the same space 
as others, and for the so called normal people to accept the deviant, “the Others”, to what 
was earlier exclusively their space. It is undoubtedly easier to fit in when you look, act 




accept, someone who looks, acts and is basically the same way as you are. (Turnbull 
2016, 5.) Turnbull (2016) points out that inclusion does not come naturally to us and we 
only want to include people who are like us, or at least willing to do what it takes to fit 
in. This will is also built-in to the sick role as the requirement to seek (medical) help and 
the desire to get better (Zola 1973, 678). Therefore, it feels that medicalization in a way 
enables and promotes at least physical inclusion. Medicalization promotes unity and 
brings the Others closer to Us in many ways: at least in their looks, behavior and relational 
skills. Then it is up to us just to let them into the common spaces, to open up our doors 
and gates – quite literally, not figuratively. 
 
8.3.2. THE TWO PARADIGMS AS HINDRANCES TO EACH OTHER 
In this sub chapter I will come to the two main points of this thesis. Firstly, I will argue, 
that there are more complications in the relationship between medicalization and 
inclusion, than there are similarities and supporting matters. Secondly, I will argue that 
these incompatibilities also regard the more profound structures and ideas of the 
framework, thus making the contradictions even more severe. To summarize the many 
nuances of differences between medicalization and inclusion, I argue, that there are 
mainly four basic incompatibilities between the paradigms, but these four generate a 
multitude of consequent dilemmas and practical problems. These four main 
incompatibilities are 1) the location of agency (suom. toimijuus), 2) the degree of 
tolerance, 3) attitude towards labeling and 4) the target of change. They are next explained 
and analyzed in this order. 
Like I have examined earlier in this thesis, the proponents of medicalization regard the 




or moralistic frameworks, for example. The humane nature of medicalization rests mainly 
on the notion of the sick role. Through the sick role the deviant individual comes to be 
seen as a patient, and thus, becomes the object of medical intervention and treatment. The 
point of the sick role is twofold. Firstly, it is said to lift the stigma, blame and 
responsibility off the individual’s back Secondly, the point is to obligate the patient to 
want, seek and accept treatment. (Zola 1973, 678.)  Here we may start to see the problem 
already, but let’s dig a little deeper.  
Like I noted earlier in chapter 8, to erase or decrease responsibility is to decrease 
autonomy. Only autonomous agents can be responsible for their actions (necessary 
condition). Actually, responsibility over one’s own actions is a product of autonomous 
decision making. If responsibility is decreased, it means that some or all of the conditions 
of autonomy have been endangered. Remember, that these conditions were freedom, 
intentionality and understanding. To my understanding it can be any one, or any 
combination, of these conditions that is regarded as endangered depending also upon the 
illness or handicap. For example, with different accident related and innate conditions 
both freedom and intentionality are clearly absent. With many complicated, multi-factor 
conditions like cancer or autism, it is often mainly the understanding that is regarded 
insufficient. What is more, these approaches and views on lowered autonomy and 
different conditions of autonomy are usually implicit – hidden in the discourse, and not 
explicitly expressed in the discussions between the doctor and the patient, and their family 
or the society at large. Moreover, the decline in the individual’s autonomy or the 
conditions of autonomy are often represented in contrast with the doctor’s autonomy and 
abilities. For example, the doctor should decide on the additional inspections, tests and 
treatments, because the doctor knows better, meaning that the doctor understands the 




and so, should trust the professional and follow their advice.12 (Launis 2007, 121.) Next, 
I will briefly problematize the sick role and the decline of autonomy a bit further, and 
then, examine, why it is incompatible with inclusion.  
To me the main problem with the sick role is conceptual. How can the sick role, at the 
same time, release the person of responsibility and then obligate the person to seek, accept 
and prefer medical help? As far as the release of responsibility, and thus the lowered 
autonomy, go, they must be with respect to medical or health issues – probably even more 
specifically, with respect to that specific medical condition the person has at that moment, 
when they are diagnosed and then treated. What I mean to say is, that although the patient 
may have less responsibility and autonomy over their illness, only very few, and only 
quite rare, diagnosis’ are thought to diminish their responsibility or autonomy in other 
fields of life. Remember, that autonomy is not a categorical condition. For example, 
people suffering from cancer, HIV, flu, tinnitus, acne or heart failure would still be 
regarded responsible for, say, murder, robbery, paying bills, putting on clothes and 
feeding their cat. Of course, there are also some (nowadays) medical conditions, like 
mental retardation, psychopathy and Alzheimer’s decease, amongst others, that 
significantly lower the autonomy and responsibility in other fields too, but it is still 
concerning or because of their illness. These people too, can be autonomous in certain 
decisions and actions, not related or caused by their illness, like deciding what food to eat 
in a restaurant, which color of back bag to take to a park, or to watch TV or to play chess 
after supper.  
Like noted earlier, autonomy is a continuum: not an on/off –state but a dynamic property. 
																																																						
12	Controversially enough, many times the individual is also blamed for some, so called, 
lifestyle deceases, like liver cirrhosis for alcoholics or diabetes or coronary heart 
decease for obese people. The treatment of such conditions encounters a steady stream 




Thus, the decline in autonomy due to the implementation of the sick role must be a decline 
regarding medical issues. Now then, how can the person be obligated to certain actions 
and attitudes precisely in respect of their illness or medical condition? How can one be 
obligated to do something and not responsible for precisely that something? This is really 
quite confusing and complicated, and I believe this is also at the root of some problems 
regarding involuntary treatment, treatment of addicts and other social control issues of 
medicalization13. I also believe that this can be a mere semantic issue and only an 
ostensible problem, but the core trouble here, once again, is the lack of explicit definitions 
and open, full disclosure of some basic principles, premises and arguments of 
medicalization.  
Now let’s turn to the disagreement with inclusion. When understood in the broadest sense 
of the concept, the aim of inclusion is to increase involvement, participation and agency. 
These are all dependent on autonomy, and that is precisely the point: to empower the 
marginalized people and give them back the autonomy regarding their own issues. The 
point is, to give them say, at least about their own lives and issues directly concerning 
them. That way, and only that way (as autonomy generates responsibility), these people 
can be responsible of what happens to them. So, they can be both charged and praised for 
their actions and decisions, because these are both important sides of being a competent, 
independent and committed human being. Being free of blame and responsibility might 
be of little consolation if you are deprived of autonomy. So, the paradigms are in a clear 
																																																						
13	Often, for example, people are reprehended over going to a spiritual healer instead of 
going to the hospital, when they have, say, cancer – especially if that decision later 
proves to be futile or harmful. Instead, the sick person has a duty to see a doctor, 
whereupon almost magically the patient’s responsibility, as well as autonomy, over their 
pathological condition end, and become the responsibility of the doctor. Now, if the 
measures taken by the doctor prove to be futile or harmful, no one is reprehended 
(unless the doctor has committed malpractice or some other crime), but instead the 




contradiction with each other when it comes to autonomy: It is impossible to, at the same 
time, diminish autonomy and to support autonomy. 14 
There is another ideological contradiction and incompatibility between these two 
frameworks. Different ways of defining and understanding difference lead to differences 
in how much deviance we are ready to tolerate. The stricter the definition of normality, 
the less the framework tolerates difference and deviance. (Mercer 1973, 25, 32). 
Medicalization tries to rely on strict, objective definitions of normality, like the statistical 
and bio functional models of normality, where the line between the normal and the 
deviant is supposed to be quite clear-cut, mathematical even. Inclusion, on the other hand, 
admits that normality is a social construction and as such, it is changing, dynamic, culture 
dependent and arbitrary. For this, we have very different levels of tolerance between the 
paradigms: Medicalization does not tolerate difference or deviance well, whereas 
inclusion does – it is the whole point of inclusion. By contrast, the whole point of 
medicalization is to cure, as in erase or diminish, deviance and adverse differences. In the 
medicalization framework difference is pathology. In the inclusion framework difference 
is a riches. Something cannot be an undesirable pathological state and a celebrated quality 
at the same time. Hence, we have another contradiction.  
According to previous studies, the medicalistic view of deviance hinders genuine and 
complete realization of the ideals of inclusion. The problem is that inclusion, a true sense 
of belonging and substantial participation cannot happen, while the deviant are seen as 
significantly different than Us, the majority, and thus, in need of treatment, betterment or 
																																																						
14 Note, that medicalization does not explicitly and purposefully diminish autonomy. It, 
sort of, just happens through the sick role and through the patient-doctor -power 
relations. Medical professions also seem to acknowledge this problem, because their 
ethical codes often try to emphasize respecting the patient’s autonomy. Inclusion maybe 
supports autonomy more purposefully and explicitly, but many times also indirectly, for 




cure. (Russel 1998, 16–17.) Medicalization aims at labeling (=diagnosing) and treating 
deviance, and in so doing fading the multitude of difference and deviance from view, thus 
sustaining a narrow view of normality. I mentioned earlier that medicalization may, in 
some sense, facilitate physical inclusion. That is just it: Medicalization only contributes 
to physical integration, not overall inclusion. Where medicalization asks, should we 
normalize (=cure) this, inclusion asks, should we accept this. These are by definition 
almost the opposite approaches. Medicalization plays to our desire to stay within our 
comfort zone where remarkable deviances are not shown (Turnbull 2016, 6.)  Inclusion 
is integration coupled with social justice and a sense of belonging. Medicalization hinders 
the latter conditions. It has been stated, that the social constructivist model better supports 
genuine inclusion than medicalization does. The social constructive model actively 
encourages to break and dismantle potentially harmful customary patterns of thought and 
social construction, and to broaden the boundaries of normality. (see Vehmas 2005). We 
move from medicalization to inclusion precisely when we move from managing 
pathologies and defects, to tolerating and supporting different skills and needs 
(Lappalainen & Mäkihonko 2004, 70–71.) 
These two major contradictions I have presented thus far, are more theoretical and 
ideological incompatibilities. I will next argue that there are also at least two more 
practical inconsistencies, too. First of these is the procedure of labeling. Medicalization 
claims to reduce stigma, as it does not blame or condemn the deviant, like we used to do 
before. However, instead it assigns a diagnosis, which is a type of label as well. This, 
however, is not seen as problematic by the proponents of medicalization, as the diagnosis 
is regarded as a scientific, and thus a non-normative procedure. On one hand, this can be 
true: diagnosis is not as stigmatizing as such oppressive terms like imbecile, retard or 




outside the individual. (Richards 2012, 22) In case of medicalization it comes from a 
distinct professional group, ergo the professionals of medical sciences (Mercer 1973, 34). 
This represents the dominance and supremacy of the medical profession on one hand, and 
on the other hand, the paternalism of the majority or of the professionals who know best, 
instead of the deviant being the experts of their own situation (Richards 2012, 26; Lipsky 
& Gartner 1996, 776). According to medicalization, we need the diagnosis, because only 
then we know what treatment to assign and how (Richards 2012, 29). The medical model 
of disability sees special education, for example, as a symptomatic treatment to disability. 
Disability diagnosis implies the need for special treatment and special treatment is best 
provided in special systems. This is often the well-meaning rationale behind arguments 
for segregation.  (Lipsky & Gartner 1996, 763.) 
 It has been said that inclusion is the opposite of this: Inclusion is abandoning the labels. 
Whereas medicalization needs the diagnosis to know how to proceed and what to do. 
Inclusion, on the other hand, would abandon paternalism, and thus the need for others, or 
for the professionals, to know what to do. Instead, inclusion would encourage the dialogue 
between different individuals, asking them how they feel, experience and understand their 
deviance, and how they would want to, or need to be treated. (Richards 2012 25–26.) 
When special treatment leads to special systems the structure generates continuing 
dependence of external help and services, and so, restricts genuine participation and 
independence. This way we come to deprive the deviant of their equal possibilities to be 
heard and to belong, making them lesser citizens. (Gartner & Lipsky 1996, 764.) So, the 
other social framework deconstructs labels, while at the same time, the other generates a 
more organized system, and even a manual for labelling (diagnosing) the deviant. These 
are not compatible policies. 




inclusion and this one is of a more practical nature, too. This incompatibility generates 
from the depolitization, that Conrad and Schneider (2010) pointed out. Medicalization 
depoliticizes human problems, as when they are understood as illnesses, or other 
pathological deviances, they can only be seen as individual problems. Thus, the larger 
perspectives on the surrounding social and societal factors, like the effects of one’s 
socioeconomic status, gender, race, or other subcultures, are overlooked. While medically 
treating the problem, we are most often just applying the so called symptomatic treatment 
(suom. oireenmukainen hoito). This may not even be the cure for the pathology, and it 
most certainly is not the solution for the underlying problems and their initial reasons.  
Zola (1973; 1966) has noticed, that sickness and health have a strong sociocultural 
dimension, or rather, that they themselves are social phenomena. According to Zola 
people do not primarily seek medical help because of the adverse symptoms, or the 
experience of being ill, or even because the illness is getting worse. Instead, people ask 
to be treated by a doctor, not when the symptoms are at their worst, but when the illness 
or the symptoms start to collide with their social environments and social lives. People 
most often go to the doctor’s when the illness starts to disturb their lives, but not in the 
sense of symptoms coming unbearable in themselves, but because they go against other 
expectations, like when you should go to work, or travel, but you have the flu, or when 
you should have energy to take care of your children, but are too tired or in pain etc. (Zola 
1973; 1966.)  
This goes well together with the notions, that disability is not caused primarily by the 
impediment itself, but by the social and physical structures, that make the impediment 
problematic and harmful. What is ironic, however, is the doctor’s inability to take into 
account the big picture of the patient social environment and other societal structures, 




appointment in the first place (Zola 1966; 1973). Thus, the so called symptomatic 
treatment seems unfounded, or insufficient at best, because the symptoms in themselves 
are not the problem. The experience of illness, like the experience of inclusion, is a 
subjective, emotional experience, and a process as well. What symptoms the person 
experiences, how they experience them, and when and how they seek treatment for them, 
are greatly influenced by sociocultural factors. The subjective experiences, in turn, 
influence the way the patient talks about symptoms, and what symptoms they choose to 
disclose in the first place. The symptoms the patient articulates, and the way the patient 
talks about them, influence further examination and tests done by the doctor, and thus, 
ultimately, the diagnosis and treatment that patient receives. Consequently, the act of 
diagnosing and treatment are ultimately sociocultural processes. This is not fully 
recognized by the medical profession. (Ibid.) 
By contrast, solving the underlying larger scale problems is just what inclusion tries to 
accomplish.  So, it seems that the targets of medicalization and inclusion are very 
different, maybe even utterly opposite. For the other the target of action is the deviant 
individual or even his or her specific deviant or symptomatic features. For the other the 
targets are the structures, norms and systems of the society. While inclusion says, that the 
society or the institution needs to change to accommodate and accept every individual, 
medicalization says, that every individual has to change, to fit into the society or the 
institution. Inclusion aims at deconstructing the boundaries of normality, while 
medicalization aims at fitting every individual inside the existing boundaries of 
normality. The attempt of fitting everybody in only endorses the narrow and solid 
boundaries of normality, while simultaneously the other paradigm tries to pull the rug 
underneath the whole social construct of normality. Thus, it seems that the paradigms are 




Below, I have summarized the incompatibilities of medicalization and inclusion in a 
simple chart.  
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Someone supporting the compatibility of these two paradigms may argue, that the 
examined differences and even some apparent contradictions do not mean that the two 
paradigms are mutually exclusive, but only that they have a different scope. Both 
paradigms are simultaneously present in our society, and some of their ideas and 




deal with slightly different areas of human difference and diversity. Thus, it could be 
highly beneficial for them to influence the society together, as they could function best 
and most pervasively together, thereby offering something for everyone. However, there 
is a familiar problem with this view: Where to draw the line with these two different yet 
adjacent scopes of influence? Yet again we are back at the task of clarifying the concepts 
and definitions. If we could formulate better demarcations and definitions of medical 
deviances or illnesses and other non-medical deviances we could perhaps better argue for 
the harmonious simultaneous presence of the two paradigms with their respective scopes. 
No doubt, multi professionalism, pluralism and multi paradigmatic thinking are 
descriptive trends of our times. Nevertheless, we should be careful in how we divide these 
paradicmatic and professional spheres to avoid both confusion and inequality.  
Next, before concluding this thesis, I will discuss and evaluete the findings of the 
reflective equilibrium a touch further. 
9. DISCUSSION 
In this thesis, I have analyzed the concepts of normality and deviance, and placed them 
in the core of the two social paradigms, inclusion and medicalization. I have examined 
the similarities and differences between these paradigms, and through reflective 
equilibrium expressed a few ways in which these differences can become so grave and 
profound, that the two paradigms start to feel incompatible with each other.  
 
Some of the approaches of these paradigms are contrary to each other, but that does not 
necessarily mean that the two paradigms cannot survive and even thrive together. In the 
last chapter, for example, I pointed out the difference between the object of change: For 
inclusion, it is the surrounding society or institution, and for medicalization, it is the 




why these beliefs cannot survive and pertain together at the same time. That is, they do 
not rule each other out, as we can try to change both. Maybe that is even the way to best 
and most all-encompassing solution, so that everyone would do their part – the individual 
as well as the institution.  
 
Helen Turnbull (2016) emphasizes the notion, that inclusion does not come naturally to 
us. According to her, the will to include others is not in our nature, but paradoxically the 
need to be included is. The need to be included and the fear of being excluded is common 
to all of us. To be included we strive to be like others, as we unconsciously know that we 
only want to include others who are like us, or who, at least, would like to be like us, and 
who are willing to fit in. (Turnbull 2016, 1–5.) At the same time everyone is an individual, 
all people are different, and there exist vast diversity among people and their races, 
cultures, subcultures, religions, language etc. So, to be diversity sensitive and inclusive at 
the same time, now that is the challenge (Ibid., 1). So, to sum up, to include others we 
want them to fit in to the dominant culture and society. Medicalization, ergo medical 
interventions and treatments, may help some deviant individuals to fit in better, making 
it easier to include them. This way, inclusion and medicalization can complement each 
other and make the combination the best solution. However, in this solution we fail to be 
diversity sensitive, as we only want to fade away the diversity and deviance. Thus, many 
proponents of inclusion would argue, that it would not be real, authentic inclusion.  
 
According to Turnbull (2016) this inauthentic inclusion results from our desire to stay in 
our comfort zone. In other words, it stems from our fear of, or discomfort with difference 
and deviance. For this we would want a world where diversity is not shown and not seen. 
However, that is not inclusion, that is normalization, and it is more convergent with 




differences can be shown, seen and heard, but without us being scared of them. (Ibid., 
32.)  
 
Inclusion understood as diversity sensitivity allows us to be both an individual and part 
of the group. We cannot make sense of ourselves or our social world as totally unattached 
individuals, without any connections to some groups and subgroups. Diversity sensitivity 
also allows us to be sometimes uninclusive in the inclusive society. For example, we can 
spend more time with our friends from the same school or football team, or we can gather 
together in our religious groups and congregations, we can attend a concert for heavy 
metal fans or we can feel more at home with our own countrymen. This is possible also 
in the inclusive society, because it is not exclusion, but the celebration of our differences 
and diversity in the society. (Turnbull 2016, 1). It is also important to understand, that 
there are many other differences and deviances than medical deviances, like the 
differences of religion, language, socioeconomic status, race and lifestyle (see for 
example Graham-Matheson 2012). 
 
The point of inclusive schools is to prepare the children for the inclusive world and 
inclusive society. The thought behind this aim is that inclusion contributes to the learning 
and well-being of every child, and creates a circle of acceptance and tolerance. When the 
Other is present, it is more easily accepted. So, it is thought that inclusion in schools 
rebuilds the whole society, by teaching us see deviance, not as abnormal or subnormal, 
but as humane diversity. This makes us realize, accept and appreciate, that there is, and 
always has been, great heterogeneity in every society and thus in our everyday life. 
(Lipsky & Gartner 1996, 767, 788–789.) Inclusion in schools builds more accepting 
attitudes toward human diversity, and attitudes influence our actions. Inclusion in schools 




effective in practice, if they are in concert with other social changes. (Cornwall 2012, 
135, 139.) Now the dual ethos of inclusion and medicalization can complicate this strive 
toward concerted social changes, as we have seen in earlier chapters.  
 
No doubt, there is inclusion attempting to happening in our societies and school systems, 
but of course, there are also other, competing ideals and tension amongst these ideals. 
Moreover, these competing ideals are not limited to medicalization alone, but also include 
the pressure towards social models and mindsets, which emphasize competition, 
productivity and exceling along the lines of free market economy. The schools are 
definitely feeling this pressure, and it is shoving itself, for example, in the form of tests, 
competitions, prizes and stressing the desirability of academic and/or economic success 
and the demands of labor market. (Graham-Matheson 2012, 13; Cornwall 2012, 134–
135.) So, it is also important to remember, that these two paradigms examined in this 
thesis are not the only possible alternatives, and their differences aside, might not be the 
most ill-suited pair, either.  
 
According to Turnbull (2016), we are not an inclusive society yet. We may have not yet 
truly accepted all different individuals, but we have accepted the idea, that we should 
start accepting everyone. This change in thinking toward true inclusion, will so to speak, 
take us from checking the metaphorical box of inclusion, to expanding the box of 
inclusion. That is to say, it takes us from superficially recognizing and accepting 
differences, to seeing and understanding a multitude of differences in a way we never 
have before. (Turnbull 2016, 10–11.) 
 
Like mentioned earlier, both paradigms emphasize individuality, but in their own, 




on individuality as difference and uniqueness, and aims at accommodating all differences. 
However, what both paradigms lack, in my opinion, is the perspective on individual, 
subjective experiences on difference, deviance and sickness, marginality, acceptance, 
treatment and the struggle to fit in. The focus on deviant individuals’ experiences may 
not only shed light on how social changes are welcomed, and how they should be 
formulated to become better and more efficient, but it could also help us better understand 
the deviant and their stories. Understanding, in turn, could facilitate acceptance and 
approval of these individuals, and also, cultivate the diversity and diversity sensitivity of 
our dominant cultures.  
 
But how could we then better take into account the subjective experiences? One of the 
ways could certainly be to take the critique of disabled studies seriously and question the 
arrangements where the non-marginalized “normal” researchers study the marginalized 
and the deviant. This would be another step away from paternalism and toward the 
realization that the disabled themselves are already the experts of their own situation, and 
thus they could and should be the advisors of the social changes that concern them. 
(Lipsky & Gartner 1996, 776.) This step should also be done on different levels, not only 
concerning scientific studies and research, but for example, concerning inclusive school 
arrangements. The view that the majority, or the teachers, or the parents, know best, sits 
tight. This viewpoint, however, does not support the understanding of differences or 
experiences of inequality – all the contrary, it just reinforces the already dominant views. 
Yet, there are many matters, where the pupils’ own opinions, conceptions and experiences 
could be helpful and fruitful in improving and facilitating inclusion in practice. Like 
mentioned earlier, autonomy is not a categorical state, but a continuum, and there are 
many things which even children can decide on, or at least give their opinion on. This 




involvement. (Richards 2012, 25–26.)  
 
On the other hand, a step away from the remains of paternalism, does not mean that the 
dominant need to constantly apologize for themselves either. Turnbull (2016) points out 
that inclusion is a reciprocal process, where all parties need to be willing to both give and 
take. However, the responsibility to try and understand, and then maybe make changes 
accordingly, rests on the shoulders of the normal majority, as the marginalized and the 
subdominant already know and understand the mainstream society, as it is constantly 
everywhere, piercing through both social diversity and individual differences. The Other 
already has to understand Us in order to survive at all. (Turnbull 2016, 33–38.)  
 
Many researchers have suggested that the first step toward this understanding is the 
awareness or mindfulness of one’s own dominance and privilege, especially with respect 
to the marginalized. This means reflection and self-reflection before action. (see for 
example Turnbull 2016, 39–45; Hallett & Hallett 2012) Then again through this process 
of reflection and owning responsibility, we might also notice that all of us are, at the same 
time, both different individuals and part of some group or groups. So, we all, or at least 
many of Us, may end up belonging to different subdominant groups also. They can be 
any groups or subgroups, like those of the sex, sexual orientation, religion or the like, as 
not all deviances are medical. (Graham-Matheson 2012.) Any of us can also at some point 
in their life end up medically (or otherwise) deviant or disabled. For all this, there is even 
more reason to establish a more open, broader discussion, where everyone can participate 
and be heard, and where we could harness the positive forces of diversity and restrain the 







In this thesis, I have analyzed the paradigms of medicalization and inclusion and their 
theoretical compatibility with each other. Both of these paradigms are dominant and 
visible in our modern western societies and their institutions, specifically in the school 
institution and education in general. Both of these paradigms also apply the concepts of 
deviance and normality as the backbones of their policy-making. However, the definitions 
of these conceptions vary both between, and inside the two paradigms. For this, the public 
discussion, as well as the practical applications of these two ideologies, are often 
problematic, as we seem to be lacking in common language with respect to these concepts 
and conceptions. Thus, one of the aims of this thesis has been to clarify the terminology, 
and so, to facilitate the discussion trough concept analysis. At the very least I hope to 
have exposed the differences and contradictions in the terminologies and the usage of 
language concerning these concepts and paradigms.  
Trough out this thesis, I have analyzed the differences and similarities between the 
paradigms of medicalization and inclusion. The main aim has been to deduce, if the 
paradigms are compatible with each other or not. Whether they are mostly similar or not, 
is not relevant for the compatibility. Two paradigms can be quite different, yet compatible 
and complementary, one filling out the caps the other one, and vice versa. In chapters 8 
and 9, however, I have argued, that with the case of inclusion and medicalization, this is 
not entirely the case. In some respects, the two paradigms can be seen as complementary 
and coherent with each other. Nevertheless, some of the differences between the 
paradigms are so grave and contradictory, that they do not seem to be compatible with 
each other. The main incompatibilities found and analyzed in this thesis have been the 
contradictory notions on agency, different degrees of tolerance, contradictory attitudes 




more profound and severe than the ostensible similarities, which are more shallow and 
superficial, and often seem to lean on the narrowest interpretations of the terms of 
deviance and normality, or of medicalization and inclusion themselves.  
Someone supporting total compatibility of these paradigms may argue, that their 
contradictions do not reveal incompatibility, but only that the paradigms have a different 
scope. Ergo, they would apply to different types and manifestations of human diversity 
and deviance. Thus, some types of deviance should be handled according to the ideals of 
medicalization, and some others according to the ideals of inclusion. This seems 
plausible, and in theory, I also agree with this notion. However, along with it, we are back 
in the demarcation problem, as we do not seem to have any valid and common way of 
discerning the medical deviances from other deviances. Partly this is caused precisely by 
the progression and advancement of each ideal to more extensively cover all the questions 
of human deviance. The reasons why they both quite inevitably become more and more 
extensive paradigms are different. With medicalization, this is caused by a narrow and 
strict conception of normality, which puts pressure on normalizing (curing) almost all 
types of deviance and human diversity. The line between sickness and health is, if 
possible, even blurrier than the line between normal and deviant. Then again, with 
inclusion, this happens naturally along the notion that everyone is different and special, 
and that the structures of society should accommodate all people.  
So, if we accept that there exist some kind of incompatibilities or contradictions between 
the paradigms, it seems that there are at least three ways of solving the problem. Firstly, 
we may set out to solve the demarcation problem between the medical deviances and the 
deviances best tackled with inclusion, thus assigning different domains for these 
paradigms, and allowing them to exist side by side, but not simultaneously within the 




paradigm all together and only applying the other, so eradicating the incompatibility. And 
finally, we can reject both paradigms and pick or construe a new one, a third alternative. 
 I believe that this thesis has already been a step toward the first alternative, toward 
solving the contradictions and the demarcation problem, by revealing these problems in 
the first place. Of course, the practical reality may not concern itself with these problems 
at all. Some agents and institutions can follow and practice inclusion (like schools) and 
some others medicalization (like medical professions). However, this can be confusing, 
problematic and even harmful to the individuals who come across both types of 
institutions receiving mixed messages and contradictory attitudes and procedures. 
Precisely for this, a further theoretical analysis as well as more empirical analysis of the 
discourses concerning both paradigms and the mapping of their respective domains are 
needed. These studies should also be done multi-professionally, or else we risk only to 
re-enforce the paradigm we already represent in some way. In this study, I have not aimed 
at refuting either paradigm nor endorsing one over the other, but to increase the theoretical 
discussion over these social paradigms and their relations, and to clarify the terms and the 














Arras, JD 2009. The Way We Reason Now. In Steinbock, B. (edit.) The Oxford 
Handbook of Bioethics. Oxford University Press, pp. 46–71. 
Aspenson, Steven Scott 1998. The Philisopher’s Tool Kit. New York: ME Sharpe Inc. 
Beauchamp, Tom L. & Childress, James F. 2001. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. New 
York: Oxford University Press Inc. 
Biklen, Douglas 2001. Inkluusion sosiaalisia konstruktioita: Käytännöstä oppimassa. In 
Murto, Naukkarinen & Saloviita (edit.) Inkluusion haaste koululle – Oikeus yhdessä 
oppimiseen. Jyväskylä: PS-kustannus. 
Boorse, Cristopher 1977. Health as a Theoretical Concept. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 
44, No. 4, s. 542–573. 
Carel, Havi 2008. Living in the Shadow of Illness. RSA Journal, Vol. 154 No. 5535,  
pp. 26–29. 
Conrad, Peter 1992. Medicalization and Social Control. Annual Review of Sociology, 
Vol. 18, pp. 209–232. 
Conrad, Peter & Schneider, Joseph W. 1992. Deviance and Medicalization: From 
Badness to Sickness. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.  
Cornwall, John 2012. Leading on inclusion: the sum of the parts is not the whole story. 
In John Cornwall & Lynne Graham-Matheson (edit.) Leading on Inclusion: 
Dilemmas, Debates and New Perspectives, Routledge. 
Crockett, Jean B. & Kauffman, James M. 2001. The Concept of the Least Restrictive 
Environment and Learning Disabilities: Least Restrictive of What?. In James M. 
Kauffman & Daniel P. Hallahan (edit.) The Illusion of Full Inclusion: A 
Comprehensive Critique of a Current Special Education Bandwagon, PRO-ED Inc. 
Daniels N 1996. Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and 




Dupre, John 1998. Normal People. Social Research, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 221–248. 
Ekins, Alison 2012. The importance of whole school culture of inclusion. In John 
Cornwall & Lynne Graham-Matheson (edit.), Leading on Inclusion: Dilemmas, 
Debates and New Perspectives, Routledge. 
Graham-Matheson, Lynne 2012. How did we get here? A brief history of inclusion ad 
special educational needs. In John Cornwall & Lynne Graham-Matheson (edit.) 
Leading on Inclusion: Dilemmas, Debates and New Perspectives, Routledge. 
Gräsbeck, Ralph 1995. Normaalin käsite lääketieteessä.  In Pekka Louhiala (edit.) 
Lääketiede ja Filosofia, Yliopistopaino, Helsinki. 
Hallett, Fiona & Hallett, Graham 2012. Inclusive and ethical research. In John Cornwall 
& Lynne Graham-Matheson (edit.) Leading on Inclusion: Dilemmas, Debates and 
New Perspectives, Routledge. 
Hume, David 2000.  A Treatise of Human Nature. David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton 
(edit.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jackson F 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kahane, Guy & Savulescu, Julian 2012. The Concept of Harm and the Significance of 
Normality. Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 29, No.4. Doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
5930.2012.00574.x. 
Kauffman James M. & Hallahan, Daniel P 1993. Toward a Comprehensive Delivery 
System for Special Education. In James M. Kauffman & Daniel P. Hallahan (edit.) 
The Illusion of Full Inclusion: A Comprehensive Critique of a Current Special 
Education Bandwagon, PRO-ED Inc. 
Kuhn, Thomas 1985. The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the 




Lappalainen, Kristiina & Mäkihonko, Minna 2004. Inklusiivinen, kaikille yhteinen 
koulu haasteena erityisopettajan- ja opettajankoulutukselle. In Atjonen & Väisänen 
(edit.) Osaava opettaja – Keskustelua 2000-luvun opettajankoulutuksen 
ydinaineksesta, Joensuu: Joensuun yliopistopaino. 
Launis, Veikko 2007. Moniarvoinen terveys. Turku: Aeropagus. 
Launis, Veikko & Räikkä, Juha 1995. Kuka on sairas?. In Pekka Louhiala (edit.) 
Lääketiede ja filosofia, Helsinki: Yliopistopaino. 
Lindley, Richard 1986. Autonomy. In series Peter Jones & Albert Weale (edit.) Issues 
in Political Theory, Macmillan Education Ltd. 
Lipsky, Dorothy Kerzner & Gartner Alan 1996. Inclusion, School Restructuring and the 
Remaking of American Society. Harvard Educational Review, 1996, vol. 66, no. 4, 
pp. 762–796. 
Lipsky, Dorothy Kerzner & Gartner, Alan 1999. Inclusion and School Reform: 
Transforming America’s Classrooms. Paul H. Brookes Publishing Co. 
Lääkäriliitto 2013. Lääkärinvala. https://www.laakariliitto.fi/liitto/etiikka/laakarinvala/, 
read 22.11.2087. 
Mercer, Jane R. 1973. Labelling the Mentally Retarded. University of California Press. 
Middlemas, Bridget 2012. Learning and teaching in inclusive classrooms. In John 
Cornwall & Lynne Graham-Matheson (edit.) Leading on Inclusion: Dilemmas, 
Debates and New Perspectives, Routledge. 
Moberg, Sakari 2001. Opettajan näkemykset inklusiivisesta opetuksesta. In Murto, 
Naukkarinen & Saloviita (edit.) Inkluusion haaste koululle – Oikeus yhdessä 
oppimiseen, Jyväskylä: PS-kustannus. 
Mock, Devery R. & Kauffman James M. 2002. Preparing Teachers for Full Inclusion: Is 
It Possible?. In James M. Kauffman & Daniel P. Hallahan (edit.) The Illusion of Full 





Naukkarinen, Aimo & Ladonlahti, Tarja 2001. Sitoutuminen, joustavat resurssit ja 
yhteistyö – Välineitä kaikille yhteiseen kouluun. In Murto, Naukkarinen & Saloviita 
(edit.) Inkluusion haaste koululle – Oikeus yhdessä oppimiseen, Jyväskylä: PS-
kustannus. 
Nummenmaa, Lauri 2009. Käyttäytymistieteiden tilastolliset menetelmät. Helsinki: 
Kustannusosakeyhtiö Tammi. 
O’Neill, Onora 2002. Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Oshana, Marina A. L. 1998. Personal Autonomy and Society. Journal of Social 
Philosophy, 29 (1), s. 81–102. 
Pinola, Minna 2008. Integraatio ja inkluusio peruskoulussa: luokanopettajien 
asennoituminen kaikille yhteiseen kouluun. Kasvatus: Suomen kasvatustieteellinen 
aikakauskirja, (2008) 39:1. 
Puumala, Laura 2017. Normaalius medikalisaation kontekstissa. Pro gradu- tutkielma, 
Turun yliopisto, Filosofian, poliittisen historian ja valtio-opin laitos.  







Rawls John 1973. A Theory of Justice. Oxford University Press. 





Russell, Marta 1998. Beyond Ramps: Disability at the End of Social Contract. Monroe: 
Common Courage Press. 
Salamanca Statement and Framework for Action on Special Needs education 1994. 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0009/000984/098427eo.pdf, read 27.11.2018. 
Saloviita, Timo 1999. Kaikille avoimeen kouluun: Erilaiset oppilaat tavallisella 
luokalla. Jyväskylä: Atena. 
SEP 2017. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/necessary-sufficient/, read 27.11.2018. 
SEP 2011. Concepts. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/, read 27.11.2018. 
SEP .2013. Egalitarianism. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egalitarianism/, read 
27.11.2018. 
SEP 2016. Reflective Equilibrium. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-
equilibrium/, read 27.11.2018. 
SEP 2017. Science and Pseudo-Science. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-
science/, read 27.11.2018. 
SEP 2018. Thomas Kuhn. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thomas-kuhn/, read 
27.11.2018. 
Siipi, Helena 2004. Naturalness in Biological Conservation. Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics, vol. 17, no 6, pp. 457–477. 
Siipi, Helena 2008. Dimensions of Naturalness. Ethics and the Environment, vol. 13, 
no.1 pp. 71–103. 
Singer, Judith D. 1988. Should Special Education Merge with Regular Education?. In 
James M. Kauffman & Daniel P. Hallahan (edit.) The Illusion of Full Inclusion: A 
Comprehensive Critique of a Current Special Education Bandwagon, PRO-ED Inc. 
Soan, Sue 2012. Multi-professional working: the way forward?. In  John Cornwall & 




Perspectives, Routledge.  
Sober, Elliot 2013. Core Questions in Philosophy: a Text with Readings. New Jersey: 
Pearson Education Inc. 
ten Have, Henk A. M. J. & Bert Gordijn 2014. Handbook of Global Bioethics. 
Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. 
Thompson, David 2012. Whole school development, inclusion and special educational 
needs: acknowledging wider debates. In John Cornwall & Lynne Graham-Matheson 
(edit.) Leading on Inclusion: Dilemmas, Debates and New Perspectives, Routledge. 
Tulloch, Alistair 2005. What Do We Mean by Health?. British Journal of General 
Practice, April 2005, s. 320–323. 
Turnbull, Helen 2016. The Illusion of Inclusion: Global Inclusion, Unconscious Bias 
and the Bottom Line. 
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kutu/reader.action?docID=4648713&query=, 
Business Expert Press, read 27.11.2018. 
Opinto-opas, Turun yliopisto, Luokanopettajan tutkinto-ohjelma 2018–2020. 
https://opas.peppi.utu.fi/fi/tutkinto-ohjelma/7630, read 27.11.2018. 
Tähtinen, Unto 1976. Ahimsa: Non-violence in Indian Tradition. London: Rider and 
Company. 
Vehmas, Simo 2005. Vammaisuus: Johdatus historiaan, teoriaan ja etiikkaan. Helsinki: 
Gaudeamus Kirja. 
Väyrynen, Sai 2001. Miten opitaan elämään yhdessä? – Inkluusion monet kasvot. In 
Inkluusion haaste koululle: Oikeus yhdessä oppimiseen. Jyväskylä: PS-kustannus. 
Wachbroit, Robert 1994.  Normality as a Biological Concept. Philosophy of Science, 




Wachbroit, Robert 2003. Normal Humans, Human Nature and Genetic Lessons. In 
Genetic Prospects: Essays on Biotechnology, Ethics and Public Policy. Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2003, s. 51–60. 
Watters, Ethan 2010. Crazy Like Us: The Globalization of the American Psyche. New 
York: Free Press. 
Wright, Richard A. 1987. Human Values in Health Care: The Practice of Ethics. 
McGraw-Hill Inc. 
Zola, Irving Kenneth 1966. Culture and Symptoms – An Analysis of Patient’s 
Presenting Complaints. American Sociological Review, vol. 31, no. 5, pp 615–630. 
Zola, Irving Kenneth 1972. Medicine as an Institution of Social Control. Leiden, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-954X.1972.tb00220.x/pdf, read 
22.11.2018. 
Zola, Irving Kenneth 1973. Pathways to the Doctor – From Person to Patient. Social 
Science & Medicine, vol. 7, pp. 677–689. 
Zsasz, Thomas S. 1974. The Myth of Mental Illness. New York: Harper Perennial. 
 
